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The profound economic and social changes which have taken 
piacé in Hungary since the collapse of communism in 1990, 
have brought such changes in the area of civil relations that 
their legal coherence requires the framing of a new Civil Code. 
The concept of the new Civil Code was prepared on the basis of 
a Government Resolution in 1998, titled Conception of the New 
Civil Code. The Conception would like to integrate the broadest 
possible rangé of priváté law regulations stipulated in specific 
laws, among others, the regulations of family law. Thus the sub- 
stance of family law will be incorporated in the Civil Code as a 
separate Book of the Code.
Brief History of Hungárián Fam ily Law
The comprehensive codification of Hungárián family law was 
accomplished fór the first time in 1952 by the Family Law Act. 
Despite the date of its passing — this was the worst Stalinist 
period - the Act was a respectable piece of legislation. It must be 
stressed that the principle of equal rights fór husband and wife in 
both marriage and family life in generál, as well as the requirement 
to protect the interests ofthe child, were identified as fundamental 
principles of the Act. What is more, even the terms like “child bőm 
out of wedlock” and “fatherhood outside of marriage” were no 
longer included: the Act gave the same rights to such children 
as children bőm within marriage, in terms of both family law and 
inheritance law. (These regulations date backto 1946.)
Changes in family relations call fór the updating of family law 
on a more or less constant basis. This task has been addressed 
partly by legislation and, on many issues, partly by judicial prac-
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that the Hungárián Code will be broken intő five Books, Family Law, the 
subject of my presentation, being one of them.
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tice, which may often be regarded as the forerunner of legislation. Hungárián courts have 
adopted generál rules of lawthat have been codified through legislative enactment. These 
codifications have been instituted by amendments of the Family Law Act. Since 1974 the 
State has provided financial assistance in cases where child support was temporarily in 
arrears. The autonomy of spouses was strengthened by a 1986 amendment which made it 
possible fór the spouses to enter intő contract in property issues, deviating from the statu- 
tory matrimonial property system. In 1995, the concept ofjoint parental custody ofchildren 
was introduced fór those parents who were living separately. Furthermore, in 1997, the 
Hungárián Parliament passed the Child Protection Act, piacing administrativetasks in con- 
nection with the protection of imperilled children on new grounds.
Hungárián family law has alsó been influenced by the incorporation of interna- 
tional family law norms: e. g. in 1986 Hungary adopted the Child Abduction Treaty, 
and in 1991, Hungary ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The most 
significant rule incorporated intő Hungárián family law was the “best interests of the 
child” standard, which is an indispensable requirement in the course of the court 
proceedings and decisions concerning the child.
The R equirem ent of the Harm ony of Fam ily  
and Individual In terests
Integration of the body of family law intő the Civil Code would certainly raise more 
questions than would be raised by adjusting the amended Family Law Act to today’s 
circumstances. One of the most important questions is the requirement of the har­
mony of family and individual interests. The increasing autonomy of the members 
of the family must nőt violate the interests of the family as a unit. Self-determination 
and protection of the family are the two aspects on which the Conception of the new 
Family Law Book has been built. The Conception intends to ensure the harmony of 
these main principles especially in the field of the law concerning the rights of the 
child and in the inner relations of the spouses too. Bút how can the law intervene in 
family relations on behalf of the child or one of the spouses?
Different legal systems have different approaches to defining the extent and depth 
to which the regulation of family relations should be a legal function, beyond which 
such relations should be regarded as the “ internál affair” of families and in respect to 
which legal intervention is likely to prove unnecessary. Similarly, different national leg- 
islations have a different view of the extent to which they want to exercise State pow- 
ers and authority to resolve conflicts within legally regulated family relations. In many 
countries, the legal trend seems to be in the direction of restricting State intervention 
as much as possible, or while retaining the possibility of State intervention, give prefer- 
ence to alternative Instruments, particularly mediation and alternative arbitration.
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The Principles of the N ew  Fam ily Law  Book
The peculiarities of the social relations regulated by family law necessitate that certain 
fundamental principles, characteristic of family relations bút typically differing from 
civil law, should be formulated in the preamble to the Book on Family Law.
1. Among the principles in the preamble to the Family Law Act, it is justified to 
preserve the principle of protection of marriage and family, the principle of equal 
rights fór parties both in marriage and parent-child relations, as well as the princi­
ple of the protection of children and the priority of their interests.
2. The harmony of social and individual interests prescribed fór the application of 
law will be replaced by the requirement of harmonizing family and individual inter­
ests.
3. The bán on discrimination in relation to family law before the European Court of 
Humán Rights — although nőt in Hungárián cases — has emerged particularly 
regarding the equal rights of children born out of wedlock. I should mention that 
this discrimination — at least at the legislative level — had already been abolished 
in Hungary in 1946 prior to the adoption of the Family Law Act.
4. Nevertheless, it is desirable to promulgate in the sphere of family law rules, certain 
principles of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, such as the principle that 
a child should, to the extent possible, be brought up in his/her natural family.
As mentioned one of the main principles is the requirement of harmony between 
family and individual interests. How does the Conception of our new Family Law Book 
intend to ensure this harmony? Where are the limits to self-determination — on behalf 
of the protection of the family, the protection of the “weaker party” - according to the 
opinion of Hungárián family law makers? I’d like to investigate this question in the main 
fields of family law: divorce, alimony, matrimonial property and parental custody.
Divorce
A significant majority of legal systems today already profess the principle of the 
breakdown of the marriage instead of the principle of fault in marriage dissolution 
cases. Moreover, it has become quite widespread in legal systems thatthey recognize 
divorce by mutual consent (joint agreement) as an independent option of dissolution, 
bút with the condition that the spouses must agree alsó on the collateral issues or 
at least the majority of them, and most legal systems alsó stipulate separation fór a 
defined period of time.
The rules of the Hungárián divorce law in essence follow the international tenden- 
cies: they accept the principle of the breakdown of the marriage and do nőt list any 
itemised causes fór the dissolution. They identify under separate rules the dissolution 
on the basis of common agreement by the parties if it extends to an agreement on the 
main collateral issues (the piacement and the support of the child, and the use of the 
family home). Generally speaking, they do nőt require any lengthy separate domicile
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or just any separation fór the dissolution of the marriage and fault may be meaningful 
in somé collateral issues bút may nőt be important unconditionally.
However, the Conception considers that the facts and rules of dissolution on the 
basis of agreement versus nőt on that basis should be more distinctly separated than 
it is stated in the current law. In the case of mutual consent, the court cannot inves- 
tigate whether or nőt the marriage is in fact irretrievably broken down if the parties 
alleged the breakdown.
In many countries the reconciliation of the parties or the more civilized settlement 
of collateral issues of the dissolution proceedings is helped by a so-called mediation 
procedure independent of the court proceedings. Mediation is already well known in 
many areas of Hungárián law as a procedure that replaces court proceedings and the 
parliament passed a law on the conditions of this kind of activity in generál in early 
2003. It could play a role in divorce law if taken nőt as something replacing the court 
proceedings bút as an institution assisting the court, particularly in settling collateral 
issues in divorce suits. An obligation to use the mediation procedure in the cases con- 
cerning the life of the child (the piacement of the child, and the regulation of contact 
between the child and the parent living apart) perhaps would mean a step forward to 
the civilized separation of the parties, too.
Alimony
The importance of alimony in Hungárián circumstances is much smaller than in many 
other countries, bút somé changes in social and economic relations will most certainly 
lead to changes in this regard, giving it greater significance.
The Family Law Act stipulates maintenance obligation or entitlement based on 
law, making no mention of the possibility that the parties may arrange maintenance 
by spouse alsó by contract. In that process — which is the more frequent case in 
Hungárián practice — one of the parties may undertake a maintenance obligation 
even when no legal preconditions require it. Allow me to mention that there are two 
comparative legal researches in Hungary surveying the European legal systems 
investigate whether certain legal systems allow that one of the parties to waive his/ 
her maintenance claims by contract. It can be questionable whether the law should 
stipulate the possibility of agreement on maintenance by the spouses, bút it still must 
be said that alimony — if so required — is a collateral issue in a dissolution process 
under mutual consent that requires the agreement of both parties.
The generál legal preconditions of maintenance by a spouse on the basis of law, 
namely, on the side of the beneficiary, do nőt require any amendment. The precondi­
tions are that the beneficiary must be in financial need fór reasons beyond that per- 
son’s control, and nőt be a person who is ineligible fór maintenance. On the side of 
the obligor the precondition is the capacity to provide fór himself and support others 
who have to be supported by him.
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However, it should be taken intő consideration that no maintenance would be due 
to a spouse, even if the legal preconditions exist in the case of a marriage or common 
law cohabitation — particularly when there are no children — that was of short dura- 
tion, say, less than a year.
M atrim onial Property
In the course of the pást ten years, significant changes occurred in property relations, 
their importance, the magnitude of priváté property, and the direct or indirect partici- 
pation of priváté individuals in economic life. However, the property-law provisions of 
the Family Law Act of 1952 came intő being when the rapid demise of priváté property 
was the government’s goal and hence they were regulated insufficiently. Legal practice 
soon showed that the matrimonial property law provisions, written in only five articles, 
were nőt satisfactory even in a world where priváté property played an ever decreasing 
role in economic life. First, court practice tried to fill the gaps, and later on, the legal 
principles developed in court practice received regulation in law, in the articles of 1974 
and 1986 amending the Family Law Act. However, in 1986 there were new develop- 
ments in economic relations, and the law acknowledged the possibility of entering intő 
property contracts that had been abolished in 1952. Thus partnere getting married 
and spouses acquired the right to determine a matrimonial property system different 
from the statutory community property régimé. The contract was valid only if a notary 
or a lawyer had certified it. Still, the provisions of community property contracts were 
regulated too briefly and nőt even unambiguously. Fór this reason, the rules of the con­
tract need to be worked out in more detail than in the current regulation. (The current 
law contains only one sentence about the substance of the contract, saying that “the 
spouses may decide, deviating from the provisions of this Act, which property should 
be joint or separate properties.”)
Basically, a matrimonial property contract can have two types of content. One is 
to stipulate another community property-law system differing from the legislative com­
munity property-law system. The other is the acceptance of the legislative community 
property régimé, deviating from the generál rules included in the law on somé issues 
(e. g., the objects of common or separate property, management of common prop­
erty in case of business-property, the rules of handling the property or disposal over 
common property). Deviation in part-issues, naturally, may alsó occur in the area of 
the optional property-law system. Of course, no law can regulate in advance the pos- 
sible and full content of such a contract, bút it is undeniable that a regulation broader 
than the current one would be necessary, e. g., the provisions of optional matrimonial 
property-law systems need to be worked out.
What are the limits to self-determination of the parties in connection with the 
possible content of the contract? I am convinced that contractual liberty, on the one 
hand, may only go to the limit that it may nőt infringe upon basic family-protection 
interests. Fór example, it may nőt allow any avoidance of the costs of the common
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lifestyle, any non-participation in the children’s financial care or any unilateral disposal 
over the rights of spouses to live in a dwelling they occupy, and, on the other hand, 
the contract may nőt aim at any encroachment upon creditor’s rights, if there are any. 
Moreover, the bán on infringement upon “sound morals” must be established in fam- 
ily law, which serves as a generál rule in the Hungárián Law of Contracts, too.
The Conception of the new Code holds that a matrimonial property agreement 
should contain a provision alsó in the case of death, and to this extent the spouses 
may have a joint will. However, such joint will provisions in the contract should lose 
their legal force when the spouses have, or one of them has a child subsequently, 
following the agreement.
The currently valid family law provisions determine separately the issues of set- 
tlement of dwelling use by the spouses in case the settlement is based upon an 
agreement between them. Couples planning marriage, and spouses, can conclude a 
contract fór the future disposal of the joint dwelling in the event of divorce. Regarding 
the substance of these contracts, the currently valid provisions need to be amended 
in certain respects.
At present a judge is entitled to deviate from the way of settlement of the use of 
the dwelling as written in the contract, in the interest of assuring the right to use of 
the dwelling fór the minor child, even according to the currently valid provisions. This 
requirement ought nőt to be lifted in the future, bút it would be necessary to prescribe 
the obligation on the part of the legal expert to inform the parties regarding this fact.
It would be necessary to recognise by law that the spouses should be entitled to 
enter intő a contract settling the use of the dwelling by the spouses nőt only in the case 
of dissolution of the marriage bút alsó in the case of termination of their cohabitation.
The principle of “protection of the family home” needs to establish special provi­
sions fór the disposal over the common dwelling without respect to the fact that it is 
common or separate property.
C ohabitation w ithout m arriage
One of the more controversial issues in the course of the discussion of the Book of 
Family Law planned by the Conception was the expansion of any rights that must be 
provided to unmarried cohabitants (so-called common law couples). Many felt that 
any strengthening of such rights would lead to a further weakening of the institution 
of marriage and family.
West-European legal systems during the last two decades almost without excep- 
tion moved forward from the earlier standpoint of “neutrality” which treated the com- 
mon-law couples as being “outside of the law”, to a positive regulation that, generally 
speaking, provides a certain degree of social security, and in priváté law, entitlements
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to maintenance and the use of dwellings and property. Obviously, in this development 
the massive growth of cohabitation without marriage played a role. In Hungárián law, 
a number of legal provisions which invest common-law couples with rights similar 
to those of married couples is alsó growing (such as pension fór the widow, or the 
widower, and preferential rates in acquisition of dwellings).
The current Civil Code of the Hungárián Republic regulates the property law 
aspects of common-law relationships in the Law of Covenants. By now, this solution no 
longer satisfies the characteristics of such relationships. The common-law relationship 
calls first of all fór regulation by the criteria of family law. This is why the Conception 
takes the position that priváté law provisions of a common-law relationship should be 
regulated in the new Civil Code nőt in the sphere of the Law of Covenant or Things 
bút rather in the Book of Family Law. The current provisions — limited exclusively to 
joint acquisition of property — should be extended in case of a lengthy common-law 
relationship to include rights of maintenance and use of common dwellings. The 
Conception does nőt suggest the introduction of a registered partnership, neither fór 
partnere of the same gender nor fór couples of different gender. The above mentioned 
expansion of the rights of unmarried cohabitants should include them without calling 
fór registration. Naturally, a possibility would be open fór the cohabitants to regulate 
their relationship in advance and in any way differing from the law. The cohabitees 
could nőt be excluded even from the possibility of making in a public document any 
statement recognizing each other as common-law couples or of asking the notary to 
give them a “certificate” about this relationship.
Parenta l custody
In the regulation of parent-child relationship, the Conception intends to consistently 
enforce the family law requirements formulated in the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. The Conception intends to expand the rights of the offspring 
vis-D-vis the parents, and in the same way to protect the child’s contact with the 
parent living apart. With regard to the European Convention on Humán Rights, the 
Concept wishes to restrict the sphere of legislative or official intervention related to 
the exercise of parental rights.
The possibility of exercising the rights and duties towards the children on the part 
of the parent living separately after the divorce or after the termination of cohabitation, 
requires on the part of both parents certain fair cooperation. Joint parental custody 
represents such a higher degree of cooperation fór which no compulsion is required, 
and this can only be assured when parents are ready and willing to exercise this 
cooperation in the interest of the child. With reference to the requirement of parental 
cooperation in order that this right might be exercised, joint custody may be adjudi- 
cated only upon parental consensus.
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The institution of joint parental custody was introduced following foreign examples 
and by observing the principles and rules of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
by provisions of the Amendment of the Family Law Act in 1995. The provisions that
András Kőrös: Self-determ ination and Protection of the Family
assure this issue in divorce proceedings or the child’s piacement take appropriately intő 
consideration the interest of the child and the willingness of the parents to cooperate.
In contrast with the provisions in certain European legal systems, joint parental 
custody after the divorce or termination of cohabitation is rather an exceptional solu- 
tion today in Hungary. The law ought to express resolutely that decisions in favor of 
joint parental custody may nőt mean any “divided piacement” of the children between 
the two parents, fór example, changing every week, fortnight, or month.
As mentioned, joint custody needs a higher degree of cooperation, and it could 
work only on the basis of the parents’ agreement. A lower degree of cooperation, 
particularly the assurance of contact between the child and the parent living apart, is, 
however, nőt a question of undertaking, bút a legal duty. Evén broader cooperation is 
prescribed by the provisions of the Family Act, which assure a right fór parents living 
separately to decide together the important issues concerning the life of the child and 
which are listed in the Act in an itemised way. (These important issues are deciding 
the child’s name, residence and schooling).
Conclusions
Assigning the limits to self-determination in the tieid of family law is nőt an easy task. 
The prescriptions of the law and the actions of courts and other authorities are consid- 
ered by somé family members as a matter of the State poking its nőse intő their priváté 
affairs. Bút the State must nőt abandon Cardinal principles such as the protection of 
the child and protection of the weaker party in generál.
The Conception of the new Family Law Book regards the preservation of well-bal- 
anced family life as one of the most important humán values which recognises the 
freedom and autonomy of the parties in making decisions on questions concerning 
their persons, bút stresses that they have to make their decisions always with regard 
to the interests of the family.
However, it has to be acknowledged that ensuring the harmony of self-determina­
tion and protection of the family may nőt be only a legal issue: it is influenced by the 
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■  Ágnes Schreiner
It takes pluck
In the case of R v Walker in 1994, Brian Martin, the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory (NT) ordered 
Wilson Jagamara Walker’s suspended sentence with a good 
behaviour bond. The Chief Justice assumed that Walker, who 
had confessed to having stabbed another Aboriginal to death in 
a fight that had got out of hand, would récéivé the punishment 
he deserved among the Aborigines. The defence had succeeded 
in persuading the judge that Walker would have to submit to 
a spear combat according to Aborigine law. Walker would be 
struck in the lég by a member of the family of the deceased, the 
Fry family; once this happened the case would be closed.
The ruling according Anglo-Australian law
At first sight, the Chief Justice would appear to have 
been acknowledging the limits of his jurisdiction and to have 
abandoned the case accordingly. In fact however he did nőt 
abdicate his jurisdiction. On the contrary, from the position 
of Anglo-Australian law he was simply confirming a principle 
of criminal justice — that of ne bis in idem, that forbids 
anyone from being punished twice fór the same offence. This 
principle was the kernel of his ruling. This verdict meant that 
the Aboriginal response to assault, offences against life and 
culpable homicide has come to be treated on an equal footing 
with Anglo-Australian sanctions. The Walker case is therefore 
seen as a milestone in the recognition of the Aborigine law
14
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of punishment.1 Bút the reversal implied in the recognition of the Aborigine legal 
system really occurred two years earlier. The High Court of Australia had already 
acknowledged the existence of Aborigine rights and claims in the now famous 
Mabo case about land rights.1 2 The judge in the Walker case must have figured that 
if Aboriginal rights concerning land were recognized, Aboriginal criminal law would 
have to do the same.3 The court instructed Blair McFarland, the Senior Parole Officer 
to produce a report on whether Walker had genuinely undergone his punishment. 
If no ‘payback’ - a pidgin term - had taken piacé within six months, the court would 
review its decision.
On the Australian side the discussion remains as to how far the application of 
Aboriginal criminal law is in breach of the International Torture Convention or whether, 
quite simply, the imposition of the punishment does nőt itself amount to a punishable 
offence that the local police should take measures to deal with. After all a country like 
Australia ‘cannot allow Aborigines going around spearing each other...’ or ‘people 
being stabbed as the Minister of Correctional Services (NT) Eric Poole pút it 
on camera.4 After all, he declared,’ The usual police tactics is that of the proverbial 
ostrich with its head in the sand. ‘Police - that is, my - policy is: we will nőt intervene’, 
the sergeant in question told the reporter. Nőt only, as he himself admitted, was his 
knowledge of ‘ tribal laws’ insufficient fór him to intervene - were he to do so he would 
be risking life and limb...5
The ruling according Aboriginal law
On the Aborigine side astonishment was the prevailing response. Walker had been 
remanded in custody fór nine months before being sentenced by the Australian court. 
Instead of implementing the sentence, the court decided that the punishment they
1 The case even made the front page of a Dutch national daily. Cf. Esther Bootsma, Aboriginals 
mogen steken en slaan, Trouw, 2 September, 1994. As in previous cases such as that of Jadurin v R 
(1982), the defence appealed to the judge to makes use of his discretionary powers in deciding on a 
sentence, with the argument that the Aboriginal could alsó expect a punishment from his own people. 
Bút the Australian judges had in each case refused to sanction the Aboriginal form of ‘retribution’. Cf. 
Diana Bell, Exercising discretion: sentencing and customary law in the Northern Territory, in: Bradford 
W. Morse & Gordon R. Woodman (eds.) Indigenous Law and the State, Foris Publications, Dordrecht 
1988, p. 376.
2 About the Mabo case and the Native Title Act (Cth) of 1993 in which the verdict was 
converted intő legislation, see Ágnes Schreiner, De film Two Laws' in een twilight zone, Rechtder 
Werkelijkheid, vol.18 (1997), no. 2, p. 112 ff.
3 Another reason fór trying to find an alternative fór a punishment based on Anglo-Australian law 
is the relatively high figures fór suicide among Aboriginal detainees.
4 In Payback, a TV documentary by Liz Jackson, produced by Ray Moynihan, broadcast in 
Australia as part of the ABC series 4corners op 12 September, 1994.
5 The same strategy was adopted in the episodes of rough justice in Staphorst in Holland. The 
police or local constables either did nőt intervene or were prevented from doing so. This was until the 
press started raising the issue and in 1961 the mayor gave the order fór firmer measures. Cf. G.C.J.J. 
van den Bergh, Staphorst en zijn gerichten, Boom, Meppel/Amsterdam 1980, p. 151 resp. p. 169.
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deemed necessary could be implemented by the Aborigines. ‘Why didn’t they listen 
to us?’ asked Kevin Fry, the brother of the deceased. Asked tor his reaction, John 
Tippett, Walker’s defence counsel declared that ‘our legal system does nőt encourage 
to have such contact with the family of the victim’. The Fry family made it known that 
they had decided that Walker should be tried according to ‘whitefella’ law and that 
they had stated as much in the presence of the judge.6 ‘He must do time in prison’, 
was their conclusion.
Seen this way, the Aborigines held the initiative in this case. The decision to apply 
Anglo-Australian law was theirs. One can rightly State that in the Walker case, the 
Aborigines had accepted the official Australian law as an alternative, with its resulting 
Australian form of punishment.
Were the case to be referred back to them, they would have had to initiate the 
Aboriginal procedure, including the possibility of a spear combat. The question of if 
- and if so, how, when and where - action should be undertaken, is determined per 
case and is the subject of a face-to-face public debate between the parties involved. 
Walker’s nine months absence in custody had made a proper implementation of the 
Aboriginal procedure impossible. In the TV documentary the Aborigines interviewed 
stressed that it had been ‘left too long’, that it was ‘no right time’ and was ‘nőt 
appropriate’.7 ‘It’s too laté now’, concluded ‘mother’ Fry, the aunt of the deceased.
The im plem entation  of the penalty
In the view of Anglo-Australian law, the spear fight can be treated separately from 
Aborigine procedure. It regards spearing as an autonomous punishment that can 
be incorporated as an alternative punishment in the series of judicial penalties 
and measures available to judges. After the different stages of the trial have been 
proceeded with and the punishable offence has been ascertained, the verdict of 
‘guilty’ follows together with a form of punishment decided on by the judge. So far 
there is no difference between the modern judicial systems in countries in Europe 
and America. There is a linear sequence of separate moments - the initial enquiry, the 
ascertaining of the facts, of whether the norm has been broken, the verdict of ‘guilty’ 
and the decision on the form of punishment (obviously in accordance with the legal 
description of the offence). Then comes the concluding moment, namely that of the 
punishment. There is a clear difference here with Aboriginal law, because spearing 
cannot be isolated as a one-dimensional form of execution of a penalty, resulting in
6 Cf. Eric Venbrux, A death in the Tiwi Islands, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New 
York/Melbourne 1995, p. 84, where the Tiwi Aborigines alsó discuss whether a case belongs to 
their competence or to the whitefella law. In many instances the Aborigines are prepared to leave 
cases to the dominant Australian legal system. The rationale tor this undoubtedly lies in their 
experience of the colonial masters who treat murder and manslaughter trials as belonging to their 
jurisdiction and are prepared to resort to the strong arm of the law to ensure that they stay there.
7 Cf. note 4.
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the closing of the case.8 Spearing with the Aborigines is at any rate nőt carried out 
according to the scenario of an execution, with the guilty party standing in somé 
enclosed courtyard faced with an alternative form of firing squad.
The old film images that accompany the TV documentary, Payback, show a 
duel in which both parties, equipped with wooden spear throwers and spears, strike 
each other in turn in the presence of a large group of people who are sitting or 
standing. One party makes a thrust, then waits, strikes again and parries immediately 
afterwards; his actions are constantly mirrored by the other. They do nőt aim at the 
head or torso - only at the legs. It requires a certain technique and skill, and even 
gracefulness. The audience watches intently. As the spear fight continues, either 
party can be wounded, and the result is anything bút certain. It is more appropriate to 
talk of a judicial duel than of the implementation of a punishment.9 During the duel, a 
judgement is carried out in the Aboriginal manner, a ritual form of judgement, such as 
has alsó been granted a piacé in European legal history alongside oracles and trials 
by ordeal.10 1The spear fight is therefore nőt a substitute fór the punishment; rather it 
replaces the actual court hearing or trial.11 If he had been serious about respecting 
Aboriginal law, the Chief Justice would have had to declare himself unauthorized to 
try the offence the party was charged with.
The rules of the duel
By contrast with ‘fooling’ round’ or ‘fightin’ dirty’ - namely, a spontaneous fight usually 
provoked by jealousy, an insult or other supposed injustice as background cause, 
with, still more often, drunkenness or the ‘heat of the moment’, in the foreground - 
a fight according to Aboriginal law is called a ‘good fight’.12 A dirty fight can be the 
immediate pretext fór a ‘good fight’ even if the latter does nőt immediately follow on 
from the former. The former sort of fight is a banal event that can happen in the same 
way as so many chance occurrences. Bút it does of course have consequences. The 
initial skirmish is - if possible - broken up to invite the contending parties to take each 
other on at another moment in a ‘good fight’. Aborigines make use of the occasion to
8 The same goes fór penalties such as ‘pointing’, involving a voodoo-like stabbing with a boné, 
or ‘singing to death', which is a sort of exorcism, to mention only the most remarkable forms of 
Aboriginal sentences.
9 And one should at any rate avoid any terminology that might suggest that what is involved is 
a form of taking the law intő one's own hands or a rabid attempt at getting revenge, as Poole's 
description - ‘going around spearing each other' - would seem to imply.
10 If the judicial duel is allocated a position next to the Oracle and the ordeal it can then be regarded 
as belonging to the European pást, something that modern law would certainly welcome. Bút the 
question remains of whether judicial duels can alsó be treated as a thing of the pást. It might allow 
one to see the fight between soccer supporters at Beverwijk in 1997 in a different light.
11 Cf. Johan Huizinga, Homo ludens, A studyof the p l^  element in cultuie. Beacon Books, New York, 1986.
12 Gaynor Macdonald, A Wiradjuri fight story, in: lan Keen (ed.), Being biack: Aboriginal cultures 
in ‘settied’ Austraiia, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra 1988, p. 181. Cf. alsó Bell, op. cit., p. 377, 
where the fight, that incidentally is alsó one between women, is called ‘fair’.
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organize the fight as a ritual. Rituals lend themselves perfectly to obtaining control over 
whatever it is that happens to humán beings. Whether it is a disaster or bad weather, a 
change of season, a birth, a piece of good fortune, a knifing incident or a death - ritual 
makes sure that the pretext or banal event does nőt have its normál consequences 
and that in its stead a new well-organized situation is created. Of course the situation 
is a purely artificial one, supervised by masters of ceremony, whose role varies from 
boss to viliágé elder or referee. The moment that the ritual event commences the 
everyday world and normál motives are suspended. The motives fór wanting to fight 
the night before may be very different from those constructed by the time morning 
comes and the circumstances and the audience have changed’ - that is Macdonald’s 
comment on an official duel that took piacé on the morning after an initial conflict.13
The judicial duel then has its own beginning at an agreed time. It has someone 
who stands above the contending parties and ensures that the prescribed rules of the 
fight are obeyed. The piacé too where the fight takes piacé is alsó nőt a coincidence. 
Macdonald jötted down a detail of a story about a duel among the Wiradjuri or Koori 
Aborigines of New South Wales (NSW): ‘There used to be gates right up there in 
the corner, there used to be gates - are they still there? Yes... up at the gates, at the 
gates, that’s where they had the fightin’ ring - and underneath the railway bridge.’14 
It is a fixed piacé that both friend and enemy make their way to before the hour 
decided on; they assemble on opposite sides according to the party they support. 
This arrangement is regulated by the person who acts as referee - his position is alsó 
proven on the spot by means of a test or challenge.15 During the combat, the public 
is nőt permitted to interfere with the fight - they may nőt even ürge on or encourage 
their own side or shout catcalls or insult the other side.16 In such events, which as Bell 
says are ‘very carefully stage-managed’, it is clear that the character of the fight and 
the weapons to be used are alsó determined in advance.17
Bearing these rules in mind, a duel has a course of its own and - this was the 
reason fór explaining the rules - its own result too.. The duel is considered finished 
when one of the parties falls down or is struck. The wound with which the fight ends 
may result in death, bút the rule is to ‘hit to wound’, nőt to ‘hit to kill’, as the Australian 
judge in the case of R v Herbert et al realized.18
13 Cf. Macdonald, op. cit., p. 182.
14 Macdonald, id., p. 179. On p. 181 she telis us that the spot involved is a lighted vacant site used 
as a carpark, outside the gates of a mission post.
15 His authority does nőt apply in advance; it depends on whether his intervention is appreciated 
and his instructions will be followed. The same goes fór the next person to come forward in the 
absence of a response. Cf. Macdonald, id., p. 184.
16 Macdonald, id., p. 184. On p.186 she describes how the referee intervenes and calls fór order 
when an onlooker begins to ürge her party on.
17 Cf. Bell, op. cit., p. 377, in cases of a fight where a traditional fighting stick is the weapon 
used. Cf. Bell, id., p. 377 and p. 378. In the duel described by Macdonald, the agreement is that 
the contendants may only fight with their fists. Cf. Macdonald, op. cit., p. 195. Fór ‘fighting with 
the tongue', see the article by Marcia Langton, Medicine Square, in: lan Keen (ed.), Being black: 
Aboriginal cultures in ‘settied’ Austraiia, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra 1988, pp. 201-225.
18 Quoted by Bell, op. cit., p. 378.
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The duel sanctions
In a physical sense there may be a winner and a loser, bút the true victory of the 
Aborigines does nőt lie in the result bút in the beginning of the fight and in the course 
it takes, in the fact that it is entered on and that both parties pút up a good show. 
‘Someone who does nőt make a good show fór themselves - is half-hearted or starts 
to fight dirty - will nőt win support. Someone may pút up a good fight against an 
opponent recognised as being stronger and more skilful. Although technically the 
loser, they will still be admired fór their pluck.’19 ‘Pluck’, or courage, is what it is all 
about. The pluck to come up fór the deed one has perpetrated.20 Furthermore, the act 
itself testified to the necessary courage - the courage, that is, to break a taboo. Nőt to 
mention that of the people who come up fór the taboo that’s been broken - that takes 
somé courage too!
No matter how often the opposite is claimed, breaking a taboo should nőt be 
regarded as the transgression of a norm - at least nőt if we base ourselves on the 
original meaning of the word ‘taboo’. The fact that something is taboo doesn’t mean 
that it is forbidden, bút that it is provided with a identifying mark.21 Taboo therefore 
means a sign or a mark. Something that attracts attention and that is open to being 
read. Something one takes notice of, and that one cannot simply overlook. One 
can pass it by on condition that one respects the mark and is prepared to take the 
consequences. What the consequences are depends entirely on the departure point 
or the intention with which the taboo is broken. In most cases it works out alright and 
everything goes as it should.22 Bút sometimes more is at stake: one has broken the 
taboo and is on the other side; one has come to stand as it were behindthe taboo. The 
consequence is that the taboo breaker has himself become taboo, thus acquiring fór 
himself the qualities that were tabooed and which were taboo fór him. These qualities 
include exceptional talents or powers, often dedicated to ancestors of guardian spirits 
(‘genii’). It cannot be said that these taboo qualities are bad in principle.23 They are 
summed up under the term ‘mana’.24 If the person in question is positively tabooed,
19 Macdonald, op. cit., p. 189.
20 In her enquiry intő the social value that fighting has tor the Aborigines, Macdonald concludes 
- mistakenly in my view - that pluck is a right: ‘the right of individuals to stand up fór themselves 
and to brook no interference from others' (Macdonald, id., p. 188).
21 Oosthoeks Encyclopedie, Utrecht 1968, 6th edition: ‘Polynesian adjective tapoe, meaning 
provided with an identifying mark, used fór places and objects where something exceptional is 
involved, bút nőt necessarily anything to do with religion.'
22 A small ritual is sufficient to show respect, One lowers one's eyes or makes a detour (fór 
instance if one has to walk pást one's mother-in-law or sister), or one bows or says a greeting (fór 
instance, if one meets an elder), one offers somé food on a leaf or the first draft of a bottle as a 
sacrifice (on passing the spot where one's ancestors are buried). Seen in this light, the ritual is alsó 
a sign included in a series that goes from sign to sign, instead of a behavioural norm issuing from 
a system of norms, in which one norm weighs more than another.
23 It can go either way, similar to Machiavelli's concept of ‘virtü’ (// Principe, 1532), that derives 
from the Latin word ‘virtus’ and which can alsó be translated as ‘courage’.
24 Cf. as in note 21, Oosthoeks Encyclopedie.
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‘mana’ may mean fame, honor, prestige, success, sex appeal and privilege - things 
that as everyone knows are nőt reserved tor everyone. То figure out whether ‘mana’ 
is auspicious or nőt it has to be weighed in the scales, on the principle of who dares 
wins. It is this set of scales that, in keeping with Huizinga’s line of thought, is effectively 
the Scales fór the Aborigines.25
It is too simple to assume that what is involved in the combat is a split between the 
two conflicting parties with one side defending the taboo and the other breaking it. Is it 
that one warrior fights fór the norm and thus fór peace and quiet and a certain way of 
dealing with the established signs and taboos? Does he take a stand against the other 
warrior who has had the effrontery to transgress the form, because he wants to claim 
more ‘mana’ fór himself? Bút neither of the spear fighters lack courage (‘mana’): the 
pluck to challenge and the pluck to accept the challenge. They are recognized by the 
bystanders as Challenger and challenged (taboo) and will engage in the fight (‘mana’) 
in an enclosed space (taboo). In compliance with the rules (taboo), one blow will follow 
on another. Pluck is involved, as said already; bút dexterity, cunning, concentration, 
aggression, skill and strength (all of them ‘mana’) are alsó at stake. Every blow that 
is delivered, no matter whether by Challenger or challenged, evokes a moment of 
‘mana’ upon which a moment of taboo follows immediately and unmediated, after 
which another moment of ‘mana’ dawns and so on. There is no serious possibility of 
‘mana’ and taboo being installed as a permanent moment, let alone that a prohibition 
or a norm could be instituted. Only the moment of ‘that’s enough now’ or ‘no more 
then’ will have that opportunity.26
In the Aboriginal duel too, no fixed role is attributed to the perpetrator and the 
Challenger, who, according to Anglo-Australian law, takes up the cause of the victim 
or injured party. The perpetrator becomes a victim as soon as the other party deals 
him a blow; the other party who represents the victim at once becomes a perpetrator, 
who again becomes a victim if he suffers the consequences of a counter-attack... 
Perpetrator becomes victim, victim becomes perpetrator.
This secret reversal, that actually lies hidden in every conflict or confrontation is 
elevated to the status of a principle in the judicial duel. It should be clear by now no 
specific moment can be identified in a duel like this in which a punishment is meted out 
or where a sanction is imposed. In fact the duel sanctions this lack of sanctions.27
Nor does the conclusion of the duel offer any sanction, prohibition or norm, 
because the end is only a consequence of the course of the duel. Between one ‘strike’ 
and reception and the following one, the most appropriate strike is decided on and 
with it an end comes to this permanent interchange just fór a moment. At most, the 
end instigates a new rite, namely that of ‘shaking hands’ or ‘calling it quits’. They had
25 Huizinga, op. cit. p.79
26 Macdonald, op. cit., p. 187. The spectators (...) stop the fights if one of the antagonists says 
they had enough (id., p. 188).'
27 Fór our ancestors who spoke Latin, ‘sanctioning’ meant in the first piacé making something 
sacred, and derives from the word ‘sacer’; it thus implied the notion of consecration, a ritual practice, 
that is. In the first contribution to the Rode draad series on ‘Sanctions’, Henket speaks in this 
connection of ‘positive sanctions', that he then leaves aside because he wants to limit his definition 
of sanctions to negative ones. Cf. M. Henket, Sancties, ArsAequi, 46 (1997), p. 8, note 13.
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to shake hands and told them to make friends... and they sorta made friends’ - this is 
how the story of the Wiradjuri duel comes to an end.28
‘The Kooris are  socialized intő consistency ra ther than  
conform ity.’29
In the Aborigine approach by which a ritual platform is furnished fór the two sides 
that a conflict or altercation usually consists of, we see Aboriginal law in action, their 
mode of trial or what in legal anthropology is called their ‘disputing process’. The 
ritual order that is created by them provides a space fór no matter which two poles, 
extremes, or parties that present themselves. Evén the poles of Good and Évii are 
offered a ritual space. The Aborigines are consistent in ritualizing every difference. 
In this respect, they refuse to make any distinction between one or the other of 
the two poles. Western and non-Western are therefore both able to appear on the 
ritual platform. Thus it is possible to see what the Aboriginal approach will be in a 
situation where the duel is held in a Western context.30 The chance that policemen 
will be present at an Aboriginal duel is great. If they take the initiative of intervening, 
this intervention is seen from the viewpoint of the Aboriginal duel as another ‘wager’ 
placed within the fight. The usual order of events in Aboriginal is then disrupted after 
repeated interventions, causing conflict between Aborigines and non-Aborigines 
which tend to be ritualized.’31 The policemen may expect a ritual slanging-match and 
an invitation to engage in a ‘fair fight’. Bút the policemen will undoubtedly respond by 
making a series of arrests. The Aborigines will be charged with ‘unlawful assembly, 
assaulting police, resisting árrést, hindering police in the execution of their duty, 
causing damages to police vehicles, assaulting civilians, damaging civilians’ vehicles, 
and damage to property’.32 It is hardly surprising then that statistics show that very 
many Aborigines have been locked up in prisons and other detention centers.
28 Macdonald, op. cit., p. 190.
29 Macdonald, id., p. 191.
30 Cf. Langton, op. cit., p. 201. She focuses on the situation in New South Wales. The title of her 
article refers to a ritual space in Western Australia, that the Aborigines call Medicine Square after 
Madison Square Gardens. Cf. id., p. 222.
31 Langton, op. cit., p. 212.
32 Langton, id., p. 213.
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■  Lilla Farkas -  Gábor Kézdi -  Sándor Loss 
-  Zsolt Zádori:
Today’s practice of the police in racial profiling
(Original article issued in Belügyi Szemle, 2004/2-3.)
Sum m ary
Taking a short visít in jails of different countries and realising 
the huge number of ethnic minority prisoners may lead us to 
a conclusion that ethnic minority has a much higher criminal 
record than ethnic majority. In Hungary, where discrimination 
can be well observed in generál, the problem is very similar 
in almost every tieid of life except the very piacé of jails where 
Gypsies dominant.
There is a very serious debate all over the World about what 
should be done against this undesirable situation. In Hungary, 
since the change of régimé, every important public matter is 
available to study without any restraints bút researchers and 
decision-makers still could nőt find the answer fór the above- 
mentioned question.
This essay examines only one certain point of the 
discrimination as it was studied by the MHB between 2001- 
2003. The concrete subject of this research was - maybe nőt 
surprisingly - the practice of racial profiling of the police. Despite 
the restricting rules of personal data protection and court attitűdé, 
we processed a great number of files and based on these 
samples we explored somé remarkable pieces of inherence.
Analysing the relevant special literature it became clear that 
there was no such a phenomenon as Gypsy-crime: this phrase 
was developed in the interest of the possibility of controlling the 
ethnic minority by greater police forces. This theory is verified 
by the observation which proved that different instruments 
were used in criminal investigations depending on whether the 
suspected is a Gypsy or a non-Gypsy.
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When it is proved that a measure (a commanding order 
fór example) causes disadvantages fór Gypsies contrary to
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non-Gypsies the current law speaks about direct discrimination. When the applied 
measure is seemingly nőt discriminative on paper bút it is in practice - like in several 
cases - we speak about indirect discrimination.
Background
As it was already pointed out, in Hungárián jails Gypsies are the dominant ethnic. 
Up to the present we have got only two different and at the same time extremely 
prejudicial explanations tor this dominance: the first one claims Gypsies tend to 
commit crimes in higher proportion than non-Gypsies in consequence of sociological- 
cultural and financial reasons. The other theory States that all the people who have 
any role in the criminal investigation process (policemen, prosecutors, judges, even 
plaintiffs and witnesses) are racist.
Since nőne of the above mentioned theories helped us to find out the true reasons 
of the existing discrimination the MHB developed a mainly sociological and statistical 
based research system which was preceded by a test-research to sort out possible 
methodical problems. This way we established an unprecedented and unique process 
that enabled us to examine reliably and objectively the question of “Gypsy-crime”.
The phenom enon of d iscrim ination
We defined discrimination as an intended or unintended act (legal consequences, 
treatment, etc.) that affects Gypsies much disadvantageously than non-Gypsies. It 
was alsó considered as discrimination when ethnic difference was just one of the 
several different reasons which led to discrimination in case if this reason was the 
most essential one.
The phenom enon of Gypsy-Roma
We referred the suspect as a Gypsy in all cases when anybody involving in the 
criminal investigation process took any kind of comment which suggested that the 
accused was a Gypsy.
Researching m ethod
Establishing our researching method we had to pay attentions to the strict personal 
data protection in one hand and the difficulties of suspects ethnic determination on 
the other. In conclusion, we adopt a method that was elaborated fór one of the British 
government’s projects (Commission fór Racial Equality) by Roger Hood, titled Race 
and Sentencing (published in 1992).
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The data base fór the statistical working up was produced by analysing court 
files. However this procedure did nőt make us enable to examine the entire spectrum 
of discrimination against Gypsies in criminal investigation processes, since somé 
groups of criminal investigation acts (identity check, arrests fór example) were nőt 
provided according to ethnic.
Possibility of research in court files
Sociology of law cannot exist, absorbed sociologic and scientific evaluation of the 
work of the courts cannot be realized if scientists cannot get access to court archives. 
If research is limited to generál (national) archives, scientific analysis would lose its 
relevancy and be ousted from the world of living law.
It was clear that there were no special norms on research within court archives, 
nevertheless the confusion we made among actors of jurisdiction with our request was 
surprising. Though in the last few years several important jurisprudential works were 
made based on researches in court records — like the one by Krisztina Morvái on the 
delicate matter of violence inside the family or the paper on indemnification by Legal 
Defence Bureau fór National and Ethnic Minorities —, meanwhile we were informed 
that colleagues from State research institutes and faculties of law faced similar 
difficulties when requesting the right to inspect court files. Till the end of our work 
courts of somé counties had worked out a common practice that it was prohibited 
to make scientific researches in court archives. According to our experience, these 
counties are Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, and the courts of the 
Capital, Budapest.
Sam pling
The targets of the observation were all definitively finished cases of theft, petty theft 
and robbery with full documentation, which had started in 1999 (at smaller local courts 
cases started in 1998 or 2000 as well). The single unit of the observation was the 
Principal defendant of these cases. All details were from court files.
Algorithm used in this survey was a two-step, layered sampling. First of all we 
selected courts, then files. The aimed amount of units was a number of 1000-1100 
files from 15-20 courts. Finally we worked out altogether 1147 files from 18 courts. In 
the course of sampling we made efforts to let the sample reflect on reality in terms 
of régiónál differences, therefore we chose courts from regions either of a high, an 
average or a weak density of gipsy population. Eighteen courts out of thirty-seven 
authorized the survey. The territorial competence of these courts serve as a residence 
fór about 18 per cent of all the gipsy population of Hungary.
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Permission fór the research was in close connection with the number of gipsies 
living in that region: the proportion of gipsy people was 11.3 per cent on the territorial
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competence of courts that did nőt authorize surveying their files or did nőt answer 
on our request, the same rate was nőt more than 4.5 per cent on the territorial 
competence of courts that had authorized our work. In counties Borsod-Abaúj- 
Zemplén and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg only one court out of ten requested authorized 
the survey. 26 per cent of courts denied the authorization in regions where the density 
of gipsy people is less then 6 per cent, whereas the rate of denial was 78 per cent in 
regions where the density is more then 6 per cent.
It resulted a malformed sampling: territories densely populated by roma people 
are malrepresented. Sad to say: we did nőt have the chance to amend this situation. 
If the treatment received by gipsies in these regions is different in investigation and 
judicature, than it deformed our results as well. We have every reason to suppose that 
the reason fór denials is remorse or fear. Results of preceding researches show that 
there’s a stronger hostile attitűdé against gipsies in these regions among authorities. If 
it’s the same with us — and it has a chance — , it results that practice explored in this 
research shows a more favourable picture on equality before the law than reality.
We used the details on structure of criminality of gipsies when choosing the 
observed types of delicts. According to details by László Pomogyi, in the first halt of 
the twentieth century the rate of gipsy committers was higher than their frequency 
in the whole population only in case of delicts against property. A higher amount of 
gipsies were sentenced because of theft, robbery, receiving stolen goods and fraud. 
These conclusions tally with statements by Emil Molnár in his 1926 work on the 
criminality of gipsies: “their delinquency culminated in delicts against property.”
When preparing fór this research we decided to examine the files of two types 
of crimes. The reason fór choosing theft was the big number of cases, and, on the 
other hand, we supposed that we’ll find less instance documenting a very special 
treatment where officials are “used to” the presence of gipsy committers. The reason 
fór choosing robbery was the seriousness and the character (using violence), the 
degree of the expected penalty and the probable remand, and the opinion of those 
who know this topic well that the “overpresentation” of gipsies can be best observed 
among robbers.
In our final model we worked out altogether 1147 cases. Procedure against 216 
juvenile and 931 aduit offenders was involved intő the research.
R acia l/e thn ica l profiling as a fac to r of d iscrim ination
In this paper we inform about the results concerning the part of the police of our 
research on criminal procedure. We examined, how accused people got intő the scope 
of the authorities. We found a sharp deviation when examining flagrante delicto on one 
hand, and identity check (including traffic control) on the other hand. We took details on 
other types of police measures as well (e.g. Identification by witnesses, social contacts, 
warrant), bút these did nőt show a sharp difference in gipsy-non-gipsy relation.
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Details and conclusions below harmonize with results of Anglo-Saxon researches 
examining discrimination against “visible minorities” in the criminal procedure. In the 
draft we noted that because of the borders of this method and the lack of ethnical 
breakdown of details on identity check and arrestment we cannot expect the plastic 
representation of racial profiling. In spite of our reservations it seems to be 
unequivocal that practice of racial profiling is highly accepted in 
Hungary and appears as an important component of discrimination 
against gipsy people in the criminal jurisdiction.
Table 1.
How the accused got intő the scope of the authorities (juvenile and aduit together)
Getting intő the scope Non-gipsies Gipsies Aggregate
Unknown committers 48,05 55,06 49,98
Concrete person 17,72 12,53 16,29
More than one known persons 1,47 2,82 1,84
Known and unknown 0,89 2,11 1,23
Person named by the informer 8,95 13,88 10,31
Flagrante delicto 22,91 13,59 20,34
Aggregate 100,00 100,00 100,00
According to the global details every second committer was unknown to the 
authorities when starting the procedure. It’s seven per cent more frequent that a 
committer considered to be gipsy later was unknown. Every fifth offender was caught 
in the act bút there is a sharp deviation between gipsies and non-gipsies. 23 per cent 
of non-gipsy committers was caught like that, while among gipsies this rate is only 
13 per cent.
The difference resulted by flagrante delicto is equalized later, when gipsy committer 
are identified with the help of the denunciator’s observation or any other way.
The level of deviation is even higher in our model if we compare the group of gipsy 
(252) and non-gipsy (568) accusees, and observe that in case of gipsies (where there 
are details on the ethnical profile in the files) 57 per cent of defendants was unknown 
when starting the procedure, while in case of non-gipsies this rate is 47 per cent. We 
can recognize a still more spectacular difference in flagrante delicto. 21 per cent of 
gipsies and 38 per cent of non-gipsies were arrested after being caught in the act.
26
There can be more explanations on the deviation. Theoretically it’s possible that 
gipsies are better at avoiding being caught in the act, bút the reason fór the sharp 
difference can rather be that non-gipsies can be involved under the criminal procedure
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primarily when they are caught in the act. Therefore it’s more likely that a non-gipsy 
committer avoids taking the responsibility if there’s no flagrante delicto.
István Tauber, leader scientist of this field, said once: “ It has already been written 
down fourty years ago in the American special literature that people of a bad social 
status got caught easier, especially if the colour of their skin showed where they 
belong to. In Central-Eastern Europe level of prejudice is high and police forces have 
the stereotype that the frequency of criminality among gipsies is much higher. (...) 
Because of the racial labels gipsy committers are remembered, while all the others 
are forgottén, and this contributes nőt only the police bút all those who apply the law 
to become prejudicial.”
This rate has changed when examining identity check, which is used usually 
if centrally commanded, on well-defined directives. These directives may contain 
directions on controlling gipsy, foreign or dark-skinned persons more often or on 
concentrating on venues where these people regularly occur. At certain departments 
— according to our Information — the number of identity checks to be accomplished 
is fixed. All citizens have to take their ID card with themselves and give it to the 
policeman if asked. One can be arrested and called to account fór a minor offence in 
case of breach of this duty.
Table 2.
Identification of the accused by identity check or traffic control (both juvenile and aduit)
Туре of crime Non-gipsies Gipsies Aggregate
Petty theft 13 27 17
Theft 23 33 26
Robbery 20 23 22
Aggregate 17 29 20
In every fifth case examined by us it was an identity check when the authorities 
arrested the charged person. It’s hard to decide whether it’s a lót or nőt. However, 
this rate among non-gipsies was only 17 per cent, as against 29 per cent among 
gipsies. This deviation is significant. In case of more serious crimes differences 
between identity checks and flagrante delicto dicrease. One of the reasons can be 
that methods mentioned above (e.g. the false acknowledgement among gipsies) 
work less effectively.
On the other hand, the more serious is the crime, the more important is the 
identity check, namely more committers involved in the procedure that way. Among 
committers of theft this rate is one fourth, among committers of robbery it’s more than 
one fifth. This generál trend can be noticeable in case of non-gipsies as well, bút this 
doesn’t stand on gipsy people, where the identity check is the most successful with 
thieves: every third is catched like this, which rate is 7 per cent higher than the mean
27
Kontroll
value and exactly 10 per cent higher than the value observed among non-gipsies. The 
situation is similar in case of petty theft. Every fourth gipsy committer of petty theft is 
catched after an identity check, while only every eighth non-gipsy. The deviation írom 
the generál mean is as sharp as it was in case of theft.
We found the weakest level of deviation between the ethnical groups (compared 
to the allover values) in case of robbery, which let us to come to an interesting 
conclusion. Why do sharp differences that exist in case of less serious crimes equalize 
on this level? Is it possible that tricks of the police that cause the ethnical inequality do 
nőt work here? Or, do ethnical models and makings that made appearance against 
gipsies more successful in case of theft and petty theft, disappear when someone 
commits a robbery? By chance, do the police treats robbery as a so serious crime that 
they make the same efforts on finding gipsy and non-gipsy committers as well?
There’s still an other question: why is the effectiveness of identity checks the 
weakest when searching fór robbers? Surely it cannot be the more drooping attention 
by the authorities what causes this, since this type of criminality is the most dangerous 
on the society, so that the police is highly motivated on finding the offenders with 
using the tested methods.
Table 3.
Identity check, traffic control (only aduit)
Туре of crime Non-gipsies Gipsies Aggregate
Petty theft 14 30 18
Theft 23 36 26
Robbery 19 28 22
Aggregate 17 32 21
There’s a sharper difference between the ethnical groups if we take a look at 
the results of aduit offenders, compared to the global model including details of 
juveniles (17 per cent of non-gipsies, 32 per cent of gipsies). And, although the gap 
opened between the two groups, altogether the totál rate of those who were catched 
in an ordinary check is almost the same in the model of adults and the global model 
including juvenile offenders.
The observation does nőt seem to hold that among aduit offenders the more 
serious is the crime, the smaller is the difference between the two ethnical groups. 
Evén in case of robberies with 9 per cent more gipsy committers are catched with the 
help of common identity checks. We have to answer the question, why this difference 
exists in case of aduit offenders. Accepting opinions that at somé police departments 
documentation about gipsy committers used to be collected earlier legally is still in 
use can account fór the bigger success among adults.
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In both groups 22 per cent of catched committers of robberies was arrested after 
an ID check. Bút, ethnical differences are remarkable. In case of robberies differences 
between gipsies and non-gipsies in being arrested like this are compensated in the 
totál model. Among adults difference is significant according to the details above. 
However, among juvenile offenders the trend observed so far changes, and lower 
rate (19 per cent) of gipsies charged with a robbery are arrested after an identity 
check than of non-gipsies (24 per cent). We have to emphasize that it’s only in case 
of robberies and theft (and nőt petty theft) committed by juvenile offenders that more 
non-gipsies are arrested after an ID check than gipsies.
Table 4.
Identity check, traffic control (only juvenile)
Туре of crime Non-gipsies Gipsies Aggregate
Petty theft 12 18 14
Theft 26 22 25
Robbery 24 19 21
Aggregate 19 20 19
19 per cent of juvenile offenders is catched in an identity check, it’s similar to 
the result among adults and the overall results. However, there is a sharp difference 
in breakdown by ethnical groups. The number of gipsies arrested this way is only in 
case of juvenile offenders of theft and robbery shows a lower value than the number 
of non-gipsies. What makes the importance of this difference bigger is that in all three 
models (juveniles, adults and allover) ID checks brought in results rather in these 
cases and nőt in the case of petty theft. And, finally, among juveniles the difference 
between ethnical groups and the deviation from the mean values is weaker.
What can be the reason fór the differences decreasing like it’s written above? May 
we suppose that the attitűdé of policemen differs when approaching young or aduit 
gipsies? Or, are they more suspicious facing a youngster? And, is it true that the more 
serious is the crime, the more acceptable are these assumptions? Surely we find the 
smallest deviation between the model of juvenile offenders and the other two models 
in case if petty theft.
In our opinion there are two variables examined by us that can influence the 
decrease of differences. On one hand it’s the location of the crime, on the other hand 
it’s the offender’s previous record.
Every fifth person accused with a crime was catched at a simple identity check, 
and this rate is right either we count cases at smalltown courts or courts of county 
seats. Seventeen per cent of non-gipsy people charged was catched this way, nőt 
depending on the type of the city. The only strong difference is found in case of 
gipsy persons accused. While in procedures in front of courts of county seats 31 per
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cent of charged gipsy people was involved in a common identity check, this rate is 
only 24 per cent in small cities. It’s worth to mention a less strong trend that only in 
small cities the more serious the crime, the higher the rate of those gipsies who were 
identified during an ID check. This observation is to be completed with experiences 
in bigger cities, where results of ID check show being ethnically balanced in case of 
a robbery. So, the differences between bigger and smaller cities are made of results 
in cases of theft.
Results above show that in small cities probably they more or less know the 
possible quarters of committers better and this makes them doing Identification 
with a nőt so formai sreening, while in a big city every third gipsy accused with a 
crime is caught at a generál screening. Fór police forces these results show that this 
procedure is so effective that there is no reason fór working out and using a new 
screening system on a non-ethnical ground, morover, it would be totally against their 
“ interests”.
We have to emphasize that values written above are from court 
files. We do nőt own any documentation on identity checks or arrests 
so that we do nőt know how and fór what criterion policemen select 
people to be checked. All this grows the importance of being able to 
State with complete certainty that aduit gipsy mén living in big cities 
have to reckon upon an ID check with the biggest chance.
Results of the survey are in harmony with the practice of “gipsy lines” among 
police forces in the seventies and the eighties, when routinish identity check of gipsies 
was thought to be the most effective way of preventing or at least forcing back “gipsy 
criminality”. There are reports by leader policemen from these decades which teli about 
“continuous check” of suspicious gipsy persons and territories where they live or occur.
Differences explored in this survey can be explained either with the attention of a 
higher priority that authorities pay on gipsies, or the effectiveness of their own special 
social relations (“espionage”). Yet somé policemen has reported that the tactics of visiting 
premises where gipsies live and getting information from members of the community 
about committers using tools outlawed does exist. The problem is that discrimination 
in these cases is difficult to be proved, as it is seen from the report of year 2000 of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner fór the National and Ethnic Minorities' Rights:
“Suspicion of discrimination may arise in the other constituent area of the 
penal code, in the application of the criminal procedure law. Fór in many cases the 
individuals under criminal proceedings complain about why they have been brought 
under the scope of the activities of the investigating authorities and why did the 
police have to search their homes, and they feel that the police are more suspicious 
with respect to them than with respect to other potential criminals. Without going 
intő detail, in generál, itshould be noted that in the case ofthe investigation of cases 
where the identity of the perpetrator is nőt known, the police follow an established 
régimé of procedures. They have to search the location of the crime, check on the
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group of potential perpetrators, in the case of which they take intő account who 
had committed similar criminal offences applying the same methods before. In the 
case of the application of prompt actions of investigation - e.g. searches ofhomes 
of suspects - prejudice may influence the operations, however, discrimination can 
almost never be proven in such cases fór the investigating authorities make their 
decisions relying on data originating from a wide variety of sources, including fór 
anonymous reports. ’1
However, it’s possible that the police finds, where it searches. On the other 
hand, it’s definitely easier to search among gipsies, because of their living in clearly 
separated, contiguous, neighbouring localization in a city or at other premises. From 
the view of equality before the law the question to answer is: can we expect authorities 
to pay equal attention to identify or catch supposed committers who were nőt caught 
in the act even if their measures turn out to be more effective in case of members of 
a minority group which can be clearly distinguished after the colour of their skin? Or, 
the only reason fór higher effectiveness is the attention of high priority itself? As it 
is seen from somé papers written by policemen still during the communist régimé, 
the latter one is more established.
Table 5.
Identity check, traffic control in procedure against unknown offenders (both juvenile 
and aduit) in per cents
Туре of crime Non-gipsies Gipsies Aggregate
Petty theft 18 28 22
Theft 24 25 24
Robbery 31 28 29
Aggregate 21 27 23
We can give a clear idea of this dilemma through a case from the report of year 1999 
of the Parliamentary Commissioner fór the National and Ethnic Minorities' Rights:
”The teacher of a primary school (...) accompanied his pupiis -  two girls 
of Roma origin -  intő the town to perform certain tasks related to somé school 
competition. The police patrol made him and his pupiis descend the bús, emptied 
the contents of their school bags on the top ofthe engine compartment ofthe police 
cár, checked them and then asked fór the Identification card of the girls. Because 
of their young age the girls had no Identification card, so the policemen contended 
themseives by asking fór and recording their data. The teacher had been told 
neither at the start nor at the end of the action fór the reason of the action. (...) He 
believed that the girls had to identify themseives specifically because of their Roma 




headquarters because on thatsame dayseveral citizens reportedby telephoné that 
dark skinned pick-pocketing girls with blackhair “operated” on the bús and two other 
reports had alsó been made against unidentified culprits fór pick-pocketing. The 
police headquarters took the position that the policemen asked the girls to identify 
themselves in conformity to the provisions of actXXXiV. of 1994 on the police and 
it was alsó in conformity to the service regulations of the police that the clothing 
of the girls were searched. (...) Thus the police headquarters had been basically 
lawful in the opinion ofthe eh ief of police, bút in order to avoid the reoccurrence of 
similar incidents which could be complained about, he believed it to be sufficient to 
give repeated instructions to the affected police staff. The girls had been subject to 
Identification nőt because of their origin bút because they resembled the girls who 
had been reported to the police. ”
Until the laté eighties at police stations there were so called “gipsy-lines” that were 
specialized on “gipsy criminality” and “gipsy criminals”. More inquiers State that these 
old reflexes are still alive in the relation between the police and gipsies. Somé think that 
at somé police departments databanks of gipsy criminals are still in use and refreshed 
regularly, although this method has been qualified to become illegal fór years.
“The stereotype of gipsy delinquency was supported nőt only by the 
preconceptions of the majority and the press, bút the establishment of the criminal 
investigation supplied it as well fór decades. So-called gipsy-lines had existed until 
the nineties at police departments and had made an offensive through the médium 
of the press. Although these lines were abolished at the time of the democratic 
transformation, being of gipsy origin had been a characteristic sign in the practice of 
the police since 1996 when the head of the National Police Headquarters wrote in 
his internál instructions: >it’s against the norms if the police indicates someone 
using expressions on nationality, ethnic groups or ethnic status when giving 
deseriptions of someone in cases of apprehension or else<. This paper 
alsó made clear that marking ethnical status would have made the investigation 
easier: >however, this kind of labelling is unsuitable to identify physical 
characteristics in most cases and reprehensible as a professional method<. 
In spite of these facts, in news on apprehensions of certain journals -  when the 
source is the police -  still there are references on the gipsy origin, and, moreover, 
somé other statements make us think that collection of data on gipsy delinquency 
is still a practice among police forces.”2
We cannot take a stand on this question, bút surveying the ratio between 
investigations against known and unknown committers can prove that police forces 
identify gipsy committers more succesfully. In our model 48 per cent of non-gipsy 
committers were unknown when starting the investigation, while this rate among gipsy 
committers is 55 per cent. Forces had data about 51 per cent of non-gipsy committers 
and 43 per cent of gipsy committers before the procedure.
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In: Beszélő, June 2003.
Today’s practice of the police in racial profiling
Distribution by the examined crimes shows a yet more interesting face, and 
proves the hypothesis we made when checking the difference between the details 
of identity check and flagrante delicto. A sharp difference can be found only in case 
of petty theft, in view of investigations started against persons unknown. In this case 
when starting the investigation 37 per cent of non-gipsy committers were unknown, 
while this rate among gipsy committers was 51 per cent. If we survey this deviation in 
the relation of bigger and smaller cities, it will be verifiable that authorities will 11 per 
cent more likely find a gipsy committer than a non-gipsy one, if the procedure goes 
in front of a court of a small city.
We found an interesting relation between the ratio of gipsies and the effectiveness 
of investigations. (The effectiveness of investigations is the quotient of the number 
of succesfully finished investigations and the allover number of investigations.) 
According to that, in those five counties where the density of gipsies is the highest 
(in counties Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Heves, Nógrád, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Jász- 
Nagykun-Szolnok the average ratio of gipsies is 9,3 per cent) the results of police 
forces are outstanding in investigating petty theft, theft or robbery.
Table 6.
Effectiveness of investigations in counties where the density of gipsies is the 
highest in 2000
County Density of gipsies Theft Burglary Robbery
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 10,8 1st 2nd 3rd
Heves 7,6 5th 12th 1st
Nógrád 10,3 2nd 1st 4th
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 10,4 6th 4th 5th
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 7,5 9th 3rd 2nd
Average* 9,3 4,6 4,4 3
*The amount of the lowest rankings (1-5.) equals 15, therefore their average is 3
It’s right to say that it was arbitrary to choose the details of one year and to draw 
conclusions from those. However, if we take the average details of five years between 
1996 and 2000, the result will be similar. The investigation of all three examined delicts 
was six to nine per cent more succesful on a pár compared to the mean of rates 
of all 19 counties. (If we took the results of the Capital, Budapest, intő account, the 
difference would have been about eleven to twenty-four percent, bút it would nőt have 
been correct according to the fact that criminality of a big city differs very much from 




Effectiveness of investigations in counties where the density of gipsies is the 
highest between 1996 and 2000 (in percents)
County Density of gipsies Theft Burglary Robbery
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 10,8 44,68 37,24 70,66
FI eves 7,6 33,11 29,42 71,65
Nógrád 10,3 42,54 40,89 67,62
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 10,4 36,60 38,06 64,64
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 7,5 30,28 32,82 68,51
Average of these 5 counties 9,3 37,44 35,69 68,62
Average of all counties 5,1 31,74 28,48 59,30
County-wide average 4,5 26,01 24,65 46,35
The result is similar, if we survey the indexes of clearing up in the examined period 
of time. (The simple definition fór index of clearing up is the quotient of crimes cleared 
up after starting investigation against a person unknown, and the totál number of 
investigations against committers unknown.) According to this, between 1996 and 
2000, 47,64 per cent of investigations started against persons unknown finished with 
a result in counties here the density of gipsy population is the highest, while this rate 
is significantly lower (42,2 per cent) in counties Csongrád, Fejér, Győr-Moson-Sopron, 
Vas, Veszprém, where the less gipsies live.
The difference will be even more spectacular, if we take a look at the details from 
main district police forces of both three countries of the highest and the lowest density 
of gipsies. The average effectiveness fór five years is 51,32 per cent in counties 
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Nógrád and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg (where the ratio of 
gipsy population is 10,5 per cent), while it was 40,24 per cent in counties Csongrád, 
Fejér and Győr-Moson-Sopron (where the ratio of gipsy population is 1,6 per cent). 
Therefore. while the gipsy population is six and a halt times smaller in these counties, 
police forces work with a significantly, 20-25 per cent lower effectiveness than they 
do in gipsy-dense districts.
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Table 8.
Effectiveness in percents in finding unknown committers on average of years 
1996-2000
Country-wide average including Budapest 37.76










On average of three counties where the density of gipsies is 
the weakest____________________________________________
40.24
Of course it’s pleasing if the index of the effectiveness of investigation is higher, 
while the opposite is depressing. The difference itself is nőt enough to indicate the 
unlike relation between the police and gipsies, and is nőt enough as well to prove 
discrimination. Bút, it’s worth to compare the effectiveness to the frequency of delicts 
come to light.
Table 9.
Number of delicts became known and the frequency among every 10000 
inhabitants in the average of years 1996-2000
Counties
Number of delicts 




The frequency of 
delicts among every 
10000 inhabitants in the 
average of five years
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 27 129 733 370,3
Nógrád 7 469 217 344,2
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 22 028 571 386,2
On average of three counties above 56 626 1 521 369,6
Csongrád 19 691 419 469,6
Fejér 18 981 425 446,3
Győr-Moson-Sopron 21 338 424 502,9
On average of three counties above 60 010 1 268 472,9
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Although the rate of criminality (counted proportionally to the 
population) is 30 per cent bigger in counties where density of gipsies 
is the lowest, the effectiveness of investigation is 25 per cent higher 
in territories where the number of gipsy people is the most. This is 
surprising in the light of the popular belief that among gipsies there is a higher ratio of 
crime than among non-gipsies; and, moreover, it’s hard to clear up a crime committed 
by an unknown gipsy committer. In their totality, statistics seem to be 
contrary to that consistent opinion which was explored in a research 
among policemen, that “it’s easier fór police forces where there are no gipsies 
at all, moreover, the presence of gipsies hinders the work of policemen.”
There’s a widely held view in the society and among police forces as well that the 
level of crime would be much lower without gipsy delinquency. We don’t want to State 
on the opposite that without gipsies criminal investigation would be in trouble, bút the 
details mentioned above show that it’s easier fór the police where density of gipsies is 
bigger, because it’s more likely that an unknown gipsy committer of a crime becomes 
detected than a non-gipsy one.
Of course it’s an important social interest that all committers of crimes must be 
catched and called to account, bút extreme control and discriminative treatment 
against gipsies is problematic even from two different points of view. On the one 
hand, if members of an ethnical minority are subject to an extreme police control (only 
because it is clearly seen from the colour of one’s skin or the quality of one’s clothes, 
or according to one’s piacé of residence, social status or domestic relations it is likely 
that one belongs to this minority), that harms the equality of rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, and the act on equal chances. On the 
other — practical — hand, if (according to the need of efficiency and less difficulties 
in Identification of gipsies) police extremely concentrate on controlling minority 
communities, than it will take the forces away from less succesful fields of investigation. 
“Easier success” that can be reached in catching gipsies who committed a crime 
produces the false illusion of effectiveness among policemen, because in criminal 
statistics stealing of firewood or robbing a jewellery are equal details in value.
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The Fragmented Legal Vocabulary of Globalisation
Reflections on the book entitled Global Law Without a State 
(G lob a l L a w  W ithou t a S ta te  edited by Gunther Teubner 
(Aldershot-Brookfiled USA-Singapore-Sydney: Darmouth 
1997) xvii+305 p.
I. P relim inary observations
The impact of globalisation has fundamentally changed the 
regular scientific framework of social Sciences that developed 
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Each of its branches 
has started an adaptation process related to the profoundly 
transformed circumstances of the global environment. In the 
21 st century any social fact could attain a different meaning 
from the regular one as a consequence of the new global 
conditions. It was anticipated that legal Sciences, especially 
legal theory must integrate intő his framework the impact of 
globalisation. Nevertheless this process of integration has 
started slowly and nowadays the Science of legal theory has 
no comprehensive framework to interpret the phenomenon of 
globalisation. Otherwise legal theory seems to have difficulties 
in reacting to globalisation because post-modernity has 
raised many unanswered questions concerning the generál 
background of social Sciences and especially that of legal 
theory. However, the existence of this uncertainty does nőt 
mean that the research of this phenomenon from legal point of 
view would nőt be necessary.
One of the early attempts to make use of the experiences 
of globalisation in order to enrich the Science of legal theory 
and legal Sciences in generál, is the book entitled “Global 
Law Without a State.” It seems to be a very promising volume, 
and it could prove to be useful to analytically revise its 
conceptual background. This conceptual background probably 
has suggestions about the possible interpretations of the 
phenomenon of globalisation within the framework of legal 
Sciences. Prior to analysing the book in further detail, it may 
be useful to dedicate a few sentences to the phenomenon of 
globalisation.
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II. One of today’s m ost frequently  used words: G lobalisation
The sole thing different authors agree on is that the phenomenon of globalisation 
exists. They all note that something is happening in the world that has never 
happened before. The essence of global conditions has changed gradually; anyone 
can sense that since the end of the Second World War the world has undergone a 
major transformation. There is something curious and unprecedented regarding the 
differentiating characteristics of our éra. This curiosity is globalisation. Bút — until now 
— authors and researchers were incapable of creating a common comprehensible 
framework by interpreting the changes of the last decades. Therefore, since there is 
little chance to grasp the essence of globalisation easily, the only possibility remaining 
is to outline a few dimensions of the greatest social phenomenon of our time.
i. Econom ic interpretations
The majority of scholars — mainly economists —approached the phenomenon of 
globalisation from an economic point of view. These economic analyses are competing 
with each other just as much as the possible interpretations of globalisation, so it is 
difficult to find their common denominator. Another problem is that somé of these 
scholars approach the subject with a descriptive attitűdé, while others rather apply the 
political attitűdé, that every time implies somé sort of an evaluative step. Hence the 
brief presentation of two possible examples of the above-mentioned interpretations 
may prove to be solely illustrative.
John H. Dunning has made an attempt to analyse the most important features of 
this new éra. He names this éra ‘global capitalism.’ According to Dunning our age is 
the third stage of market-based, western-styled capitalism. Following the age of pre- 
industrial capitalism, which was mainly land and agriculture based, and the industrial, 
machine and fináncé based second phase of capitalism, a radically new economic 
phenomenon has emerged in the last decades of the 20th century. This new form of 
capitalism is now mainly knowledge-based and has a global dimension in contrast 
to the spatial diffusion of the earlier stages. Dunning collected five distinctive features 
of this new economic world order; (i) cross-border transactions are deeper and 
more interconnected than they have ever been, (ii) resources, goods and Services 
are spatially more mobile than they have ever been, (iii) multinational enterprises 
play a more significant role in the creation and distribution of wealth than they have 
ever done before, (iv) the financial and reál volatility has increased in a considerable 
degree, (v) the advent of digital environment and electronic commerce has completely 
changed the character of cross-border transactions.1 These features could be eligible 
to encompass and define the distinguishing features of the new world economic 
order, bút that is an other question whether this descriptive framework is a satisfactory 
attempt to explain and understand the essence of globalisation. 1
1 Dunning 11-40 esp 13.
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A considerable representative of political economy, Róbert Gilpin2 argues that 
a successful and manageable international economy is dependent on the secure 
and safe political foundation of international relations.3 Discussing the importance of 
political foundations the author seriously questions the dogmatic statements of neo- 
liberal economic thought concerning the irrelevance of political factors in the economic 
sphere. According to Gilpin a stable world economy has three political preconditions: 
firstly, a single one or a group of nations has to promote economic and political 
leadership by maintaining stable macroeconomic conditions and establishing fair 
and impartial rules to govern the international trade system; secondly, this economic 
system shall be based on cooperation among the major economic powers, because 
neither of them could manage the system alone; thirdly, every nation of the world has 
to have confidence in free-trade and other forms of international commerce.4 It seems 
that fór Gilpin, after the dramatic fali of Seattle WTO summit of 1999, the essence of 
globalised economic processes is paradoxically rooted in the global political context, 
rather than in pure economic indicators. Thus, deriving from the analysis of Gilpin, 
globalisation alsó has a strong political dimension that can essentially determine the 
main direction of global economic processes. Therefore Glipin’s work indicates the 
necessity of a deep analysis of these differing political aspects of globalisation.
ii. Other ways of interpretation ...
Other approaches of the issues globalisation raises are even less consistent 
than the economic interpretations. Therefore it is very difficult to find any common 
points of them except fór the rejection of the exclusively economic interpretation. 
These works sometime use the results of economic analyses, sometime they do nőt. 
Moreover, they often try to integrate other factors intő their researches, such as world 
politics, environmental protection, cultural elements and other problems, to give afew 
examples offeatures worth analysing. To show the richness of these kinds of analyses 
it may be useful to briefly overview two of them.
The famous French professor and publicist, Ignatio Ramonet criticizes globalisation 
taking a very elaborated and ‘orthodox’ Marxist point of view as his starting point. 
He claims that fór him the essence of globalisation is the unprecedented growth of 
inequalities. The main reason behind this serious phenomenon is the all-embracing 
dominance of the economic sphere over all of the other fields of life. Liberalisation, 
privatisation and competitiveness have been the key-words of world economy in the 
last decades of the 20th century. Through stressing them continuously and noisily, the
2 Róbert Gilpin The Challenge of Global Capitalism -  The World Economy in the 21st Century 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2002) see specially the Preface and Chapter 
Ten: Globalisation and Its Discontent
3 Róbert Gilpin The Challenge of Global Capitalism ... xv. p.
4 Róbert Gilpin The Challenge of Global Capitalism ... xv. p.
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economy gradually overruled the States and civil societies. The unipolarity of the world 
order that followed the fali of the iron curtain in 1989 alsó supports the dominance 
of neo-liberal values represented today by the official politics of the US. Thus, in 
Ramonet’s eyes globalisation — that has economic, political and environmental 
aspects — has a really negative connotation, that represents the neverseen inequality 
of the world economic system, as well as the overall dominance of neo-liberal ideas. 
Ramonet argues that only the emergence of a global civil society — based on 
the fundamental values of solidarity and depoliticisation — can counterweight the 
pressure of global economic processes and actors.5
Although the famous work of Sámuel P. Huntington does nőt explicitly deal with 
the phenomenon of globalisation, somé of its conclusions can be very constructive 
contributions to the understanding of it. Huntington connects the emergence of a 
universal civilisation with the all-embracing process of modernisation. The counter 
points of these modern societies are traditional societies that were based mainly 
on agriculture, contrary to the industrial and knowledge bases of modern societies. 
Yet Huntington argues that to identify modern societies with Western societies is 
an absolutely false simplification, because the originality of Western civilisation 
is nőt rooted exclusively in modernisation. Huntington enumerates the significant 
distinguishing characteristics of Western civilisation to verify his earlier statement. 
Those are — in brief — the legacy of classical antiquity, the Catholic and Protestant 
religious traditions, the diversity of European languages, the theoretic separation of 
spiritual and ‘temporary’ authorities, the idea of the rule of law, the theory of social 
pluralism, the emergence of representative bodies and individualism.6 The author 
emphasises that these elements can possibly develop in other civilisations, bút the 
unique combination of them gave the West its distinctive feature. Why is this essential 
from the aspect of globalisation? Huntington’s clarification of modernisation and his 
üst of elements of Western identity can show the conceptual background from which 
the process of globalisation has stammed in the last decades of the 20th century. 
Through indicating the possibility of the clash between the dominant civilisations 
Huntington reminds us of the dangers the triumph of the universal globalisation 
process poses based mainly — bút nőt exclusively — on Western characteristics.
I II. M ajor w ords of the vocabulary
A possible way to discover the volume’s main statements could be via the 
presentation of its conceptual background, through the peculiar system of a quasi- 
vocabulary. The ‘message’ of the whole book takes shape by collecting and analysing 
the most important concepts of its authors. Nevertheless, being familiar with this
5 See: Ignatio Ramonet Guerres du XXIe siécle -  peurs et menaces nouvelles (Paris: Éditions 
Galilée 2002) [Collection l'espace critque]
6 Sámuel P. Huntington The Clash of Civilisations ... 69-72. p.
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conceptual background does nőt supplant a detailed knowledge of the whole book, 
it can only give a sketch of the most important contours.
i. Legal pluralism
The theory of legal pluralism provides fór the generál theoretical background of 
the authors’ works. Every author incorporates legal pluralism — implicitly or explicitly 
— intő his or her work in one form or another. Therefore it is worth knowing precisely 
how the authors interpret this major stream of legal thinking. In his introductory study 
Gunther Teubner discusses in detail his own concept of legal pluralism7. According 
to Teubner the new phenomenon of global law can only be adequately explained by 
the above-mentioned theory, bút it is necessary to transform it parallel with the new 
conditions of the profoundly changed global environment.8 Since the early years 
of the 1940s, when the concept of legal pluralism has firstly emerged in the work 
of Llewellyn and Hoebel — in their volume entitled The Cheyenne Way and has 
crystallised in the 1950s through the famous researches of Pospisil, this theory has 
focused on the interrelationship between the different dimensions of law: the law of 
the State and the diverse laws of the different communities. Teubner argues that in 
order to make the theory of legal pluralism eligible to the explanation of the new global 
legal phenomena, it is necessary to reformulate its core concepts by shifting the focus 
from diverse groups and communities to different discourses and communicative 
networks.9 By shifting the scope of legal pluralism from the communities to the 
communicative processes the theory is ready to adequately explain the phenomenon 
of global law, because it is more able to incorporate intő its generál background the 
most of the new and thus revolutionary legal phenomena. Teubner alsó reminds the 
readers that the main distinctive feature (distinction directrice) of the legal phenomena 
is the use of the binary code: legal/illegal.10
With these remarks Teubner accepts Luhman’s interpretation of law and 
integrates Habermas’ theory of communication intő his pluralistic legal theory. Thus, 
this reconstructed concept of legal pluralism via the integration of the main elements 
from the oeuvre of Luhman and Habermas forms the generál and broad background 
of all further research presented in the volume. With the elaboration of this new form 
of legal pluralism Teubner has created a comprehensible framework, which seems to 
be eligible — even from a narrow theoretical point of view — to the detailed research 
of the new global legal phenomena. Therefore it is easy to understand Jean-Philippe
7 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukiwona: Legal Pluralism in the World Society” in Global Law 
Without a State ed by Gunther Teubner (Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Darmouth 
1997) 3-28. p.
8 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 4. p.
9 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 7. p.
10 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 14. p.
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Robé’s statement that the theory of legal pluralism is the key concept of a post- 
modern understanding of law.11
N. Global law
As a starting point of his discussion of the natúré of global law, Teubner uses the 
concept of ‘living law’coined by Ehrilch. Quoting a statement of Ehrlich1 2, the author 
declares global law a sui generis legal order, which has its own characteristic and 
therefore “should nőt be measured against the standards of national legal systems.”13 
He claims that global law does nőt have any structural deficiencies compared with 
national laws, its special characteristics distinguish it from the ‘normál’ law of nation 
States. The most characteristic feature of the global legal régimé is its lack of any form 
of political and institutional support and its strong connection with socio-economic 
processes.14 So it is a depoliticised body of rules, however, this depoliticisation does 
nőt inevitably mean that the emerging global law is value-neutral, as, fór instance, 
somé activities of MNEs proved it.15
How can the origin of this new legal phenomenon be determined? In his chapter 
Teubner rejects the ‘traditional’ political and institutional theories of law-making, those 
processes, within which the nation State plays a prominent role.16 After rejecting the 
‘traditional’ concepts of legal thinking, the author follows the above-mentioned theory 
of Ehrilch concerning the autonomous law-making of society. Since globalisation is 
reality, it has a uniquely distinctive feature: parallel with the globalisation of economic 
processes the emergence of a countervailing world society under the leadership of 
interstate politics is missing, therefore, it is a highly contradictory and fragmented 
process.17 As a result of this lack of ‘world politics’ “global law will grow mainly from 
the social peripheries nőt from the political centres of nation States and International 
institutions.”18 Thus, global law does nőt have any contact with the traditional political 
institutions of law-making, it is growing out from diverse and fragmented social
11 Jean-Philippe Robé „Multinational Enterprises: The Constitution of a Pluralistic Legal Order” 
in Global Law Without a State ed by Gunther Teubner (Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, 
Sydney: Darmouth 1997) 56. p.
12 “The center of gravity of legal development therefore from time immemorial has nőt Iáin in the 
activity of the State, bút in the society itself, and must be sought there at the present time” Gunther 
Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 3. p.
13 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 4. p.
14 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 4. p.
15 Peter T. Muchlinski „'Global Bukowina' Examined: Viewing the Multinational Enterprise as a 
Transnational Law-making community” in Global Law Without a State ed by Gunther Teubner 
(Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Darmouth 1997) 102-103. p.
16 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 6. p.
17 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 5. p.
18 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 7. p.
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institutions that are actually closely coupled with the specialised — mainly economic 
— dimensions of globalisation.
Teubner indicates that the lack of a global political system and somé global legal 
institutions may cause problems in the establishment of a global legal discourse. 
The lack of global politics shall be a serious problem because it is very difficult to 
imagine a global symbol of validity that is neither rooted in national laws, nor has any 
political support on global level.19 At this point Teubner establishes a unique concept 
to solve this theoretic problem that can be termed a paradox as well. He claims that 
through the “deparadoxification” of the phenomenon of the so called ‘self validating 
contract’ (contrat sans lói) it is possible to explain how global law, that is primarily 
contract based, creates its own non-contractual foundations fór itself. Via impressive 
argumentations, using the example of a special sort of commercial contracts, the 
so-called “closed Circuit arbitration” contracts, Teubner solves this paradox through 
transforming the vicious circle of contractual self-validation intő a virtuous cycle of 
two legal processes: contracting and arbitration.20 With this “deparadoxification” 
Teubner proves that it is largely possible to make law without the intervention of the 
State intő the law-making process. From this point on, a priváté legal order, that has 
global validity, is nőt longer unthinkable, fór instance, the law of multinationals or lex 
mercatoria, both of which shall be discussed later.
Finally, the author collects four important features of the emerging legal 
phenomenon: (i.) the boundaries of this sort of a legal phenomenon are determined 
by ‘invisible social networks’ or ‘invisible professional communities,’ therefore 
they transcend territorial boundaries, (ii.) “global law is produced in self-organized 
processes of ‘structural coupling’ of law with ongoing globalised processes of a 
highly specialized and technical natúré,”21 (iii.) global law is nőt as insulated from 
the on-going socio-economic processes than ‘normál’ national law, it is closely 
dependent on them, (iv.) it is necessary to preserve the variety of legal sources of the 
globally unified law, because a totál unity of global law would become a reál threat 
to legal culture.22 It is clear that these characteristics are fundamentally different from 
the traditional law of nation States, and according to Teubner they can partly prove 
the individual natúré of global law.
iii. W orld society
Can we talk about world society nowadays? If so, how can we define its genus 
proximum? If world society exists, can it be a generál milieu of global law? In his 
chapter Anton Schüzt attempted to sketch the contours of world society via the
19 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 15. p.
20 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 16-17. p.
21 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 8. p.
22 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 7-8. p.
44
Balázs Fekete: The Fragm ented Legal Vocabulary of Globalisation
deconstruction of classical conceptions of social and political theory23. His starting 
point is the autopoetic theory of Luhmann bút he emphasises that the essence 
of autopoetic social theory is the deconstruction of the traditional cosmomorphic 
models.24 Schütz unambiguously rejects that the distinction between system and 
environment can create a model where a system can encapsulate subsystems as 
their greater environment. The invention of the autopethic theory is the chance to 
liberate social thinking from the dominance and pressure of traditional social, political 
and legal concepts, that are rooted mainly in somé from of hierarchy, as fór example 
are sovereignty, State, power and law, and rebases it on the idea of heterarchy.25 After 
the devaluation of the foundations of these concepts that incorporate somé form of at 
least a bi-polar hierarchical relation, world society can theoretically be reconstructed.26 
According to the author these ‘traditional’ ideas are incapable of explaining our days’ 
challenges that globalisation generated after the post-modern ‘revolution’.
World society is founded on a “never ending cacophony of simultaneous 
conversations” on an order generated by nőise instead of any mastery.27 Schütz 
argues that world society is a pár exellence challenge to the concept of the primacy 
of politics, because world society is nőt based on consensus bút rather on the 
simultaneously ongoing communicative processes.28 So the world society of Schütz 
does nőt have any external, spiritual or higher level mastery or control. It is ‘based 
on’ the retusai to take any responsibility fór the activities of the others. The multiplicity 
of Communications — the continuous nőise — is capable of leading the affairs of 
world society without the intervention of any higher level, may that be reál or fictional, 
morál or legal. It could be the ‘realm of anything goes’ as Schütz describes the world 
of economy.29 The concept of Schütz is really exciting bút it is highly questionable 
whether in the years of worldwide uncertainty — just think about the humanitarian, 
economic and environmental crises after 1989 — the disintegration of the remained 
morál basis of social and political thinking and the mystification of a value-neutral 
attitűdé would help the normalisation of the situation.
iv. Lex mercatoria
We can define lex mercatoria as a body of transnational law serving fór the special 
purposes of word-wide economic transactions. Teubner argues that lex mercatoria is
23 Anton Schütz „The Twilight of the Global Polis: On Losing Paradigms, Environing Systems and 
Observing World Society” in in Global Law Without a State ed by Gunther Teubner (Aldershot, 
Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Darmouth 1997) 257-293. p.
24 Anton Schütz „The Twilight of the Global Polis: ...” 262. p.
25 Anton Schütz „The Twilight of the Global Polis: ...” 275. p.
26 Anton Schütz „The Twilight of the Global Polis: ...” 257-269. p.
27 Anton Schütz „The Twilight of the Global Polis: ...” 269. p.
28 Anton Schütz „The Twilight of the Global Polis: ...” 283. p.
29 Anton Schütz „The Twilight of the Global Polis: ...” 285. p.
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the most successful example of global law30, he indicates that this legal phenomenon 
incorporates all the characteristics that would be able to surpass — and to refute 
partly - the nation State based ‘traditional’ theories of law-making. Lex mercatoria is a 
paradigmatic case, and the experiences arising from it shall be important fór all other 
emerging field of global law, therefore it is worth going intő the details of this unique 
legal phenomenon.31 The author expounds briefly the history of the “thirty years” war 
over the independence of global lex mercatoria and emphasises that the traditional 
schools of legal thought dominated by the overestimated role of the nation State — 
represented mainly by French and American scholars — were incapable of properly 
explaining the fundamental questions of global lex mercatoria. In order to give a 
proper explanation, it is necessary to break the taboo of the necessary connection 
of law and State. The phenomenon of lex mercatoria breaks down this taboo from 
two different directions. Firstly, it claims that ‘priváté orders’ can make law valid law, 
without the control and authorisation of the State. Secondly, this means that this body 
of legal rules — produced merely by ‘priváté orders’ — is valid outside the nation State 
and International relations alsó.32
At this point Teubner poses a crucial question: does a global “rule of recognition” 
exist fór lex mercatoria? He claims that it is a law with an underdeveloped ‘centre’ 
and highly developed ‘peripheres’, therefore one shall look fór the“rule of recognition” 
on these ‘peripheres’.33 So this legal régimé of International business can be typified 
by the asymmetries of a weak institutional centre, which depends on strong socio- 
economic ‘peripheries’ stamming from the special circumstances of its global 
environment. As in the case of global law, Teubner here alsó tries to outline the 
main features of the examined legal phenomenon. The overriding feature is that 
Lex mercatoira is structurally coupled with economic processes, therefore it is very 
vulnerable to the interests and power pressure of economy. This openness might 
corrupt the originally value-neutral lex mercatoria.34 Lex mercatoira seems to be an 
“uncoordinated ensemble of many small domains, a patchwork of legal regimes”35 
as the legal system of the Heilige Römische Reich Deutscher Nation. This means 
that commercial arbitration institutions — fór instance the Chambre de Commerce 
International — are strong in the production of precedents (episodes), bút they are 
inefficient communicatively linking them up with each other in order to produce a 
unified legal doctrine. Thus, the institutional background of lex mercatoria seems 
to be nőt as efficient and solid as the actors would need it, moreover, it is weak 
from the point of view of the — above mentioned — communicative links.36 Lastly, 
lex mercatoria is a soft law mainly consisting of broad principles, nőt precise rules.
30 Gunther Teubner .Global Bukowina: ...” 3. p.
31 Gunther Teubner .Global Bukowina: ■■■” 8- p.
32 Gunther Teubner .Global Bukowina: ...” 10-11. p.
33 Gunther Teubner .Global Bukowina: ...” 12. p.
34 Gunther Teubner .Global Bukowina: ...” 19. p.
35 Gunther Teubner .Global Bukowina: ...” 20. p.
36 Gunther Teubner .Global Bukowina: ...” 20. p.
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Teubner argues that this is nőt a deficiency because it compensates the lack of global 
enforceability by making it more flexible and adaptive to the rapidly changing global 
circumstances and unprecedented cases.37
In his chapter, Hans-Joachim Mertens is dealing with the problem of the application 
of lex mercatoria.38 According to him there are two possibilities to define the essence 
of lex mercatoria. Lex mercatoria can be approached as a body of international legal 
practice if the legal system is defined as a system of norms. In this case lex mercatoria 
accounts fór an independent legal system.39 On the other hand, lex mercatoria can 
be regarded as a self-applying system beyond national law. From this point of view 
it seems to be an autonomous legal system independent of national law.40 Flowever 
these definitions do nőt guarantee a common understanding of this issue therefore 
it could be more useful to regard lex mercatoria as a potential to create norms in 
order to avoid the endless terminological debates. From this point of view this body 
of rules is a nearly complete potential fór the resolution of international, commerce 
related conflicts.41 Mertens argues that national monopoly of law-making is out of 
date today, thus exists only in theory, because in a number of cases the arbitrators 
have the rules of lex mercatoria at hand to apply. The explicit or tacit agreement of 
the parties is enough to establish the application of an independent body of law, 
and the necessities of global society are alsó in support of the applicability of lex 
mercatoria. Nevertheless, Mertens stresses the necessity of a special justification to 
the application of these rules, and emphasises the responsibility of the arbitrator when 
applying them.42 These remarks are significant because Mertens precisely points out 
the immanent limits of the autonomous system of lex mercatoria.
v. Multinational enterprises
MNEs are the most important players of today’s economic world order. Until the 
publication of this volume the communis opinio doctorum regarded them as major 
economic actors from an exclusively economic point of view. It made no attempt to 
develop a comprehensible framework to interpret their legal aspects. Therefore the 
two studies of the book dedicated to the issue can be regarded as serious efforts 
towards the establishment of such a framework, which can deal with the legal 
dimensions of the existence of MNEs. Jean-Philippe Robé43 sets out to analyse
37 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 21. p
38 Hans-Joachim Mertens „Lex Mercatoria: A Self-applying System Beyond National Law?” 
in Global Law Without a State ed by Gunther Teubner (Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, 
Sydney: Darmouth 1997) 31-43. p.
39 Hans-Joachim Mertens „Lex Mercatoria:...”32. p.
40 Hans-Joachim Mertens „Lex Mercatoria: ...” 33. p.
41 Hans-Joachim Mertens „Lex Mercatoria: ...” 35-36. p.
42 Hans-Joachim Mertens „Lex Mercatoria: ...” 39-40. p.
43 Jean-Philippe Robé „Multinational Enterprises: ...” 45-77. p.
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the fundamental questions of MNEs, while Peter T. Muchlinski44 observes MNEs as 
transnational law-making bodies.
The main issue of Robé’s work is the natúré of multinationals. According to 
his opinion the enterprise is only a socio-economic paradigm, nőt a legal concept, 
because it does nőt exist in the positive law of States. The positive national legal 
systems work with different concepts of legal persons (or personnes morales) 
bút they never define the enterprise as an explicit legal person. Therefore Robé 
claims that the enterprise is an autonomous legal order, which does nőt need State 
recognition as a prerequisite to its existence. The author describes it as a unitary, 
closed and unique order that can define ‘norms’ fór the persons under its jurisdiction 
and can create coercive means to guarantee respect fór these ‘norms’. Thus with the 
use of these mandatory internál behavioural rules the enterprise constitutes a legal 
order in the classical Werberian meaning.45 Robé stresses the fact that every MNE 
has its own legal character so “each enterprise represents an island of law having 
the character of a truly legal order.”46 The emergence of such global deterritorialized 
legal orders — as Robé finally defines the MNEs — is a serious challenge to monist 
legal concepts. Only the pluralistic attitudes can incorporate the existence of partial 
— both territorial and functional — legal orders that are competing and cooperating 
at the global level, within a global legal system.47
According to Robé’s hypothesis, each MNE constitutes an autonomous legal 
order. The next question is thus given: what is the origin of this constitutive power? 
He argues that this situation is an unambiguous consequence of classical liberal 
principles, that were incorporated intő all liberal constitutions. The protection of 
property and the acknowledgement of the freedom of contract has produced such 
a legal framework where enterprises and after them MNEs could be born. So the 
nationalisation of law never resulted in the disappearance of legal pluralism in modern 
nation States.48 Hence, the power of MNEs is derived from the classical principles 
of liberal constitutions, and this fact opened the possibility to create autonomous 
legal orders that are equivalent to that of the States from a legal point of view. The 
internationalisation of these liberal principles facilitated the evolution of a transnational 
civil society, where the major players are the MNEs and — maybe — the States.49 Fór 
instance, in the US a newly emerging constitutional order is imaginable based on the
44 Peter T. Muchlinski „'Global Bukowina' Examined: Viewing the Multinational Enterprise as a 
Transnational Law-making Community” in Global Law Without a State ed by Gunther Teubner 
(Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Darmouth 1997) 79-108. p.
45 Jean-Philippe Robé „Multinational Enterprises: ...” 52. p.
46 Jean-Philippe Robé „Multinational Enterprises: ...” 53. p. and the author indicates that the legal 
substratum of MNEs contains of contracts and property rights — which are fragmented in the positive 
law of States — as well as the MNEs have a unity of command, logic and rules, see 45. p.
47 Jean-Philippe Robé „Multinational Enterprises: ...” 49. p.
48 Jean-Philippe Robé „Multinational Enterprises: ...” 57. p.
49 Jean-Philippe Robé „Multinational Enterprises: ...” 62. p.
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separation of powers between MNEs, States and the federal government.50 This new 
‘style’ of the division of power illustrates howthe existence of MNEs can transform the 
realm of traditional legal concepts and theories.
In the other above-mentioned chapter Muchlinksi sets out from a statement of 
Teubner; the new living law of the world can be defined as “the proto law of specialized 
organizational and functional networks which are forming a global, bút sharply limited, 
identity.”51 Muchlinski claims that somé of the operational activities of MNEs show such 
a ‘proto law’ or ‘law like’ qualities, therefore it is worth examining them in detail. On the 
one hand the internál system of business organisations can be regarded as aspects of 
an emerging global law according to the meaning given by Teubner. If we think about 
law as communicative process based on the distinction of legal/illegal, three major 
groups of MNEs’ internál activities can partially fali under this standard. According 
to Muchlinski certain cases within the managerial control, somé of the contractual 
relations between the affiliated entities in the whole transnational network, and lastly, 
the adoption of intraenterprise codes of conducts as generál guidance of behaviour.52 
Muchlinksi alsó indicates that these are nőt solid concepts with precise boundaries, 
there are many uncertainties in the interpretation of them, bút somé of them can be 
defined as cases of such a ‘proto law’. If these operational activities demonstrate a 
considerable degree of consistency and generality of practice, these two characteristics 
can facilitate the acknowledgement of their ‘proto law’ natúré. The existence of a 
binding duty shared by nőt only the directly involved persons can alsó strengthen the 
‘law like’ quality of those internál activities.53 On the other hand, MNEs can influence the 
external legal environment, and this activity can be an important way to convert their 
own ‘proto law’ intő ‘hard law’ status. The activities of MNEs can directly influence the 
development of substantive rules of commercial law by their standardised contracts 
or commercial practices. Henceforth, they can affect the generation of whole national 
and international regimes via lobbying activities.54 A result of these influencing activities 
could be the emergence of a global business law that may constitute a new world order 
with newly born legal principles and institutions.55 The author emphasises many times 
that his consequences are nőt really unambiguous, in certain cases they do nőt have 
solid outlines, bút indeed it is very essential to research the ‘law like’ phenomena of 
MNEs in order to understand their operations.
50 Jean-Philippe Robé „Multinational Enterprises: ...” 71. p.
51 Gunther Teubner „Global Bukowina: ...” 7. p.
52 PeterT. Muchlinski „'Global Bukowina' Examined: ...” 80-81. p.
53 PeterT. Muchlinski „'Global Bukowina' Examined: ...” 85. p.
54 PeterT. Muchlinski „'Global Bukowina' Examined: ...” 85. p.




Although neither chapter of the book specialises on the questions of State 
explicitly, the studies reflect a solid attitűdé concerning it. Therefore it is useful to 
analyse how the authors look at the State, because it shows certain outlines of the 
post-modern conception of State. Starting from the theory of legal pluralism it is 
unambiguous that the authors want to liberate the legal thinking from the dominance 
of the nation State. Before the emergence of global law the centre of gravity of law and 
politics obviously was in the nations State, the authors argue, bút by the appearance 
of the first fragments of global law this situation has been seriously challenged. In 
consequence of the prominent role of the internál dynamics and plurality of ‘global 
society,’ moreover, its highly specialised sub-systems in the evolution of global law 
the traditional political theories of law are nőt capable any longer of understanding the 
global law, argues Teubner.56 Thus, the emergence of global law could be a serious 
chance to rethink the role of the State in the legal thinking or in legal processes.
Talking of lex mercatoria, Teubner proves in detail that it is possible to create 
law exclusively by ‘priváté orders’ and this type of law will be valid without the 
recognition of the State. Mertens supports this approach when he claims that the 
national monopoly of law-making is a simple illusion, because the arbitrators can 
base their decision on the rules of lex mercatoria independent of State, without any 
matéria! obstacles.57 It can clearly be observed that the authors try to establish the 
foundations of such a legal Science where the State does nőt have a prominent role 
in legal issues, it is no more than an actor in the field of law amongst many equally 
significant actors. In the global or world society of the future the cases of autonomous 
law-making — lex mercatoria, internál law of MNEs, and other meanwhile appearing 
special areas - could be much more important than the ‘normál’ field of law-making 
where the dethronised State might be involved. Following this line of thought it is easy 
to imagine that in the affairs of the world society of the future the State will nőt have 
any serious relevance.
The growing significance of MNEs as independent legal orders strengthens 
the earlier conclusion. If every MNEs constitutes an independent and unique legal 
order, and these legal entities are diffusing beyond and between national borders 
the exclusivity of State sovereignty will nőt be maintainable in the long run. Otherwise 
Robé acknowledges that the security structure of the world still based on the nation 
States, bút the emergence of MNEs has weakened the traditional framework of 
diplomacy and other state-specific actions. Diplomacy between States and MNEs 
could be more considerable in certain — mainly economy and business related 
— cases than the traditional diplomacy between nation States. The proliferation of 
international organizations as representatives of partial economic interests — fór
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example: WTO, certain free-trade zones and specialised representative bodies — has 
alsó altered the traditional ‘playground’ of interstate diplomacy.58
The main question raised by these well-founded conclusions concerning the 
State is the following: does the fundamental transformation of the modern context 
of statehood, indicated by the emergence of global society and law, follow the 
disappearance of the State as a generál social phenomenon? It shall nőt be 
forgottén that the main characteristic of this developing global régimé is the lack of 
any ‘traditional’ political background at global level, or the lack of politicisation, in 
accordance with Teubner. Is it possible that the dream of Engels shall be realised via 
the gradual emergence of global law and society? Nobody can be brave enough to 
answer this question with full certainty. It is only possible to indicate a contribution 
to the interpretation of this serious question. Statehood was never a monolithical 
concept, its precise outlines have changed continuously parallel to the transformation 
of the social context. The Greek idea of polis differs from the medieval concept of 
regnum and both notions differ from the modern concept of the nation State that is 
basically founded on the sovereignty doctrine of Bodin and on the monopolisation 
of coercion as in the theory of Weber. Therefore, it is thinkable that parallel to the 
emergence of global law and society a new idea of the State will appear via the 
continuous adaptation to the radically changed global context, instead of the definitive 
disintegration of statehood.
vii. W orld public order
Legal literature traditionally uses the concept of public order (ordre public) 
— especially in the fields of International priváté and public law, and with reference 
to humán rights questions — to determine the possibility of State intervention intő the 
autonomous legal processes. The justification of such an intervention is based by and 
large on generally accepted common values of a given State; such are fór example 
morality or public health. In his study Andrea Binachi reconstructs this traditional 
concept of public order in order to create a fundamental concept of the emerging 
global law.59 Binachi claims that the emergence of the doctrine of International humán 
rights has definitively altered the traditional paradigm of public International law.60 
Non-state actors — mainly humán beings — have gradually become subjects of 
International law beside the nation States. Parallel to the development of the humán 
rights doctrine the idea of world public order has gradually emerged. Fundamental 
and universal values have crystallised in the régimé of International law since erga 
omnes norms had been defined through the development of ius cogens and the
58 Jean-Philippe Robé „Multinational Enterprises: ...” 46-47. p.
59 Andrea Binachi „Globalisation of Humán Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors” in Global Law 
Without a State ed by Gunther Teubner (Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Darmouth 
1997) 179-212. p.
60 Andrea Binachi „Globalisation of Humán Rights: ...” 182. p.
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construction of the international crimes system.61 Binachi argues that these different 
legal concepts that are based on a common respect tor humán rights create the 
world public order. This universalistic concept is built on certain commonly-shared 
values —with the humán rights doctrine in the centre — and is respected by the whole 
international community. Thus, world public order can be regarded as a minimum 
level of protection that has to respected by all actors of the international community. 
The universalism of these values is based on the globalisation of humán rights as 
primary values via the growth of a transnational civil society.62 It is obvious, thus, 
that the idea of the world public order is really eligible to create the quasi-ethical 
foundations of the new global legal régimé.
viii. Maxwell case
The quickly growing complexity of global business affairs can produce a number 
of unprecedented situations when the national and internationals legal regimes 
have no adequate answers. In these cases the ‘practice’ itself has to solve the new 
problems via constructing such normative ‘answers’, that fulfil the normative void. 
The bankruptcy of the Maxwell empire, in 1991, produced a paradigmatic case, that 
can illustrate how these processes of autonomous law-making have operated on 
the very special and technical fields of socio-economic procesess. John Flood and 
Eleni Skordaki present the main question of this insolvency procedure by focusing 
mainly on the differences of the British and American insolvency regimes.63 They 
argue that the Maxwell protocol — produced as a final result of the cooperation 
between these two diverse insolvency systems — is a special hybrid: it is neither a 
contract nor an act of legislation, it is a form of priváté governance.64 As an example 
of priváté governance it is alsó an example of valid law produced by — partly 
— ‘priváté orders’. The protocol has swiftly acquired the status of a model, and it 
could be a ‘precedent’ fór future insolvency procedures when there won’t be any 
rules to govern these enormous, cross-border cases.65 The example of this protocol 
and conflict settlement process demonstrated clearly the internál functioning and 
unique processes of global law.
The above mentioned elements are only the major mosaics of a much more greater 
picture. After the overview of these rudiments it is possible to reconstruct the image of 
global law in accordance with its main characteristics reflected in the studies.
61 Andrea Binachi „Globalisation of Humán Rights: ...” 183. p.
62 Andrea Binachi „Globalisation of Humán Rights: ...” 203. p.
63 John Flood and Eleni Skordaki “Normative Bricolage: Informál Rule-making by Accountants 
and Lawyers in Mega-insolvencies” in in Global Law Without a State ed by Gunther Teubner 
(Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Darmouth 1997) 109-131. p.
64 John Flood and Eleni Skordaki “Normative Bricolage: ...” 113. p.
65 John Flood and Eleni Skordaki “Normative Bricolage: ...” 125. p.
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IV. Concluding remarks
The reviewer does nőt feel to be competent enough — due to his young age and 
relatively “inexperienced” status — to draft an overall evaluation of the above-observed 
book. Therefore the reader must be contented only with somé special remarks.
The volume reflects the generál uncertainty concerning the essence of globalisation 
within social Sciences. With respect to the majority of the observed problems the 
authors did nőt intend to formulate as exact or definite statements as the greatest 
classicals of legal and political Science — fór example Kelsen or Duverger — have 
done it. Bút this lack of certainty — if we think about it more thoroughly — is nőt 
necessarily a serious deficiency. Moreover, it could be even considered a merit of 
the book. Through the indication of the terminological, interpretative or other-like 
difficulties the authors suggest the necessity of self-restriction in scientific attitűdé. In 
the age of globalisation the belief in omniscience is nőt more than a mere — and a 
little bit ridiculous — illusion. In our age, when the availability of information is much 
more rich than ever before, the possibility of erring or at least the fact of uncertainty 
has to be accepted.
The editor and the authors have a consistent conceptual and philosophical 
background. They primarily applied the concepts and philosophical ideas of Luhman, 
Habermas, Foucault and Teubner. To sum up, the editorial concept of this volume 
is based partly on the post-modern results of social Sciences and incorporates the 
political presuppositions of modern liberalism. This alloy of post-modernity and 
modern liberalism formulates a solid and sure conceptual background and ensures 
the unity of the authors’ attitudes. Furthermore, it proves to be truly practical because 
the book can represent a unified attitűdé with solid common points contrary to many 
other articles or books. Solely one question remains in this respect: stamming from 
differing streams of thinking, take conservative ideas or the social doctrine of the 
Catholic church fór instance, would it is possible to arrive - at least in the major points 
— at similar conclusions?
The standard of the publication of the volume by all means befits the highest 
criteria. The editing seems to be perfect and elegant; there are no misprints in the 
volume. Lastly, what seems to be one of the most crucial points fór the reviewer, 
each chapter has an impressive system of notes and üst of references that can be 
very useful fór any researcher who wishes to further elaborate his insight intő either 
dimension of the emerging global legal system. The volume advocates such high 
level of intellectual activity that should serve as an example fór the young researchers 





Sometimes adapting new ideas is as difficult as inventing them. 
In the area of theory and sociology of law the situation is even 
more complicated because almost all important issues may 
concern political values, ideologies or pure individual interests. 
Bút one of the most demanding areas in this respect is the 
sociology of the legal personnel, since the scientific community 
at least partly belongs alsó to this group of people. Identities 
and sensibilities apart, this short essay might serve as a 
thought-provoking argumentation fór using new perspectives 
in sociological research of the legal system.
In this short essay I intend to show the relevance of 
the sociological perspective concerning the role of legal 
professions. There are alsó valuable historical analogies, bút 
Central European new democracies give rich research field.
Since constitutional institutions are still suffering from 
weak legitimation and pre-democratic cultural background, 
professional craftsmanship has to have outstanding effects on 
the skeleton of the rule of law and democracy. Mostly they are 
the designer, architects of the future building of democracy. 
The hindrance of this historical role in somé cases is the etatist, 
predemocratic value system as a consequence of the forty 
years socialization. The aim of this text is to shed somé light to 
a rather neglected field of legal sociology.
Legal professions during social and legal changes
Péter Esterházy in his brilliant essay, arguing on the humán 
hardships of the transformation in Hungary has written: 
“Everything has been changed only we remained the same.” This
"This article was made during NIAS (Netherlands Institute of Advanced 
Studies of Humanities and Social Sciences) scholarship in Wassenaar. 
This article was published in czhech in Sociologicky Casopis (Czech 
Sociological Review) Vol. 41 (2005): 4.
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State of affairs has brought about tremendous strains, paradoxes and burdens which 
post-communist societies must face, and alsó somé unavoidable disappointments 
which continue even long after the actual events of the peaceful revolution have 
ceased.1 The writer here emphasized the personal and social continuity as well as the 
permanent responsibility fór the pást, bút we cannot be entirely persuaded about the 
unchanged character of the actors who had made and suffered these transformations. 
During large-scale changes social actors usually undergo deep changes too, which 
in turn have transformed the previously altered environment and introduced yet new 
changes. These circles are sometimes virtuous, sometimes vicious.
The disappointments in Hungary and other post-communist countries over somé 
inherently unrealizable hopes, such as swift economic success and wealth, a more 
efficient functioning of the welfare institutions, created a new set of barriers to the 
social, political and legal development, which allowed the sociological literature on the 
question of trust in the institutions to flourish. As Krygier added, somé fulfilled hopes, 
after a short time turnéd out to be “ugly” : rule of law is nőt so nice or important term 
in the popular understanding, than are matéria! justice or equality. The unintended 
consequences of transformation are now very clear and painful: the huge social 
inequalities, poverty, atavistic nationalism, anti-Semitism, and populism, an ineffective 
State and legal system, etc. The societies that broke away from socialism have 
found themselves in a State of constant flux full of challenges and transformations 
which are grasped as crises, and produce anomy, decreasing ethical standards both 
individually and socially.
Somé years after the revolutions towards democracy, bút before consolidation 
of the new values (individual rights, minority rights, constitutional barriers) sensitive 
intellectuals have noticed a decline in the liberal values and practices, this 
tendency is summarized as the “velvet restoration” or “post-fascism” . The rebirth of 
egalitarianism, collectivism, anti-liberalism, and even anti-intellectualism seems like a 
central-European evergreen that has never really disappeared. Bút these features are 
nőt completely unknown in the West either, here too there is a generál apathy about, 
and distrust of traditional politics, as well as emerging intolerance toward strangers. 
Despite these and other detrimental phenomena, western societies seem to remain 
solid since they work with impersonal institutions backed by strong traditions. 
However, even the safety in these traditions could nőt guarantee these developed 
societies complete immunity from injurious tendencies as we saw in the case of 
fierce US hysteria, the Italian populist right and other failings. Democratic processes 
with long cultural traditions can alsó be influenced although there is always a much 
stronger hope of recovery. According to Tismaneanu new democracies are extremely 
vulnerable to upheaval because institutional, morál, and attitudinal corruptions go 
hand in hand with a new untried form of governance. The peculiarity of this situation 
is that a corporatist, authoritarian inclination, as well as a revolt against formai 
institutions and the reinvention of the pre-democratic traditions dominate the political 
agenda. While people have lost their illusions about democratization most of them 
would give up their autonomies and liberties fór matéria! benefits, and improved social




welfare. This constellation serves as good grounds fór paternalist and demagogic 
political forces seeking charismatic figures in politics to take charge. Ethnocentric 
argumentation, homogenous and vague collectivity against individual freedom and 
free thinking are nőt new additions in this region as the irrational, emotional political 
style, which emphasizes personal qualities, and authority instead of dense and 
legitimate institutions, and civic virtue. Weak institutionalization makes the lack of 
constitutional patriotism more serious: the State as a limited agent with constitutional 
legitimacy has nőt yet become an accepted figure fór the incompetent and corrupt 
institutional entities which are full of selfish and unreliable politicians and fruitless 
ideological debates.2
According to a recent survey conducted by the author, the prestige of the 
parliamentary democracy has diminished: parliament as an institution appeared as 
an ineffective quarrelling branch without considerable power.
Despite the fact that the more or less successful European unification process 
largely forced institutional changes, the new member States entered the EU 
with changed societies too.3 European monitoring procedures and programs, 
recommendations and official criteria on institutional stability, democracy, rule of law, 
humán rights, protection of minorities focused on institution-building bút meanwhile, 
and in spite of the social tensions, problems of legitimacy, and bad attitudes toward 
the legal system — these formai measures partly firmed up both the value system 
and attitudes of the society. Readers might well find two contradictory evaluations of 
the transformation of the newly emerged democracies behind these argumentations. 
Studying the role of the legal institutions and professional lawyers inside these 
institutions I have found it useful to depart from both institutional optimism and 
cultural pessimism, and refer to a new starting point fór sociological research.4 This 
is even more important to get rid of the highly political evaluation of a situation that 
I call institutional pessimism. While institutional optimism and cultural pessimism 
were divergent perspectives of the scientists and western advisors, this new kind of 
pessimism stems from inside the core of the nation, as a result of the disappointments 
that continue years after the change to democratic rule. Institutional pessimism means 
heavy cynicism over the function of the legal and political institutions and a much 
stronger reliance on such “ irrational” forces as fortune, fate, and personal ability. 
The social basis of this feeling is understandable: as a lesson from pást experience a 
considerable part of the society thinks that law is synonymous with Central command, 
the legal system is a sheer tool of the rulers or the richest strata of the populace, 
the function of the legal system is to govern, manipulate society, and society should 
defend itself. Post-communist societies generally (bút with huge differences between
2 Vladimír Tismaneanu, Discomforts of Victory: democracy, liberal values, and nationalism in 
post-communist Europe, European University Institute, Florence 2002
3 Stephan Parmentier, Implications of Enlargement fór the Rule of Law and Constitutionalism in 
Post-Communist Legal Orders, draft paper, http://www.iue.it/LAW/Events/WSWorkshopNov2003/ 
Parmentierpaper. pdf
4 Martin Krygier, Institutional Optimism, Cultural Pessimism and the Rule of Law in Martijn Krygier 
& Adam Czarnota, eds. The Rule of Law after Communism. Problems and Practices in East- 
Central Europe, Aldershot, Ashgate/Dartmouth, 1999, 77-105
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them) lack social trust and trust in institutions. There is a tendency to view the State 
and legal institutions as the enemy, antipode of the civil society.5 This is a strong 
legacy of the dissident thinking of “antipolitics” which had an anti-positivistic meaning 
in a legal-theoretical sense.
I strongly feel that in order to understand post-communist societies a more 
complex relationship between institutions and actors must be construed, which is nőt 
new in theoretical sociology, bút neither is it so widely used in research.
The relation between actors and structures is a highly complex and constantly 
debated subject in the theory of social Sciences. Fór sociology of law this challenge 
touches the very essence of the role and effects of law in society. It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to assess this long theoretical history, and I alsó omit any discussion 
on the new lines in institutionalism, both historical and sociological. Nevertheless it 
is necessary to acknowledge the relevance of this tradition fór further analysis. Fór 
the moment let us take one elemental lesson from these theories. Following somé 
attempts to adjust the divergent traditions of social Science, we should find the 
connections and mutual effects of actors and institutions.
Ignoring determinism, working institutions generally give the context and 
environment fór the behavior of the humán agents and effectively limit the scope 
of their actions. Bút actors working with and inside these institutions can alsó form 
those institutions during functioning. Take here only one example: judges sitting in 
the constitutional courts must conform to the institutional barriers to their actions that 
are designed by the law-maker. Flowever, during their assessment of a case they alsó 
have the possibility of defining their own concept of practice and forming an activist, 
or a more or less restrained position. This kind of defining activity is nőt peculiarly 
eastern or Central European and can be found everywhere in constitutional systems. 
Bút it plays an astounding role in newly established constitutional courts, which have 
no or few traditions to fali back on. As is well known, institutional frameworks perform 
a reflexíve barrier to inventive humán actions. It is true even during formative years, 
when humán creativity plays decisive roles.
Krygier has argued lucidly about the importance of legal traditions, saying that 
even in hard cases there are legal answers to legal questions, because after principles 
run out, legal traditions remain considerable.6 Nonetheless legal traditions are 
somewhat problematic in societies such as Flungary, Poland or other post-communist 
nations. Even so, I strongly agree with the evaluation that lawyers, and especially 
judges are key players in shaping the legal traditions because of their craftsmanship, 
skills, methods and competence. This legal group has played such an important role, 
more so than intellectuals have done in generál, in creating national traditions in the 
19th century: they have invented and formed the constitutional and legal traditions. 
Starting from the prescriptive natúré of the legal tradition, it is necessary to balance
5 Adam Czarnota: Meaning of Rule of Law in Post-Communist Society. Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 17 
(179—196)
6 Martin Krygier, Thinking Like a Lawyer, in: Wojciech Sadurski (Ed.) Ethical Dimensions of Legal 
Theory, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA, 1991
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cautiously between preserving and changing these elements while looking closely at 
the post-communist developments.
“ ...the pást does nőt merely speak to the present; it prescribes tor it. They are 
institutionalized: transmission of the law is nőt lett to chance bút is organized and 
regulated by institutions of recorders, transmitters and authoritative interpreters.”7
It is widely accepted in the social Sciences, that the new democracies of Europe 
have more or less successfully changed their political, economic and legal systems. 
This is a historically unique venture considering the complex program and relatively 
short time it has taken to implement it. This is alsó true of the legal system, somé 
parts of which have been transformed completely, sometimes outside, or contrary 
to, the traditions, while other parts proved to be more problematic, biased or strongly 
resisted any changes.
During evaluation of the changes and stability throughout the nation, which 
remains one of the most important theoretical issues of legal sociology, one can 
differentiate between at least two types of non-changes. Continuities in the legal 
system in post-communist societies are conservative or Progressive according to 
the openness fór such normative (prescriptive) ends as rule of law, constitutionalism, 
democracy, etc. Among the positive or Progressive continuities the most generál 
is the basic structure of the civil law system which, in itself, gives many possibilities 
fór planned legal reforms and promises greater success because of the formal- 
rational character, reliance on codification and rational law-making.8 Evén during the 
totalitarian régimé and later in the context of post-totalitarian socialism, the positivist 
feature of the legal system, namely the fact that written regulation must be taken intő 
consideration, offered judges relatively safe protection against the sheer demands of 
the political elite groups. The institutional basis of the legal system was permanently 
stable following a short revolutionary period when lay elements in the administration 
of justice and legal education had been pút in piacé The initial communist ideological 
assumption of laicization had been strongly limited in all east European countries 
both by dictatorial Stalinism and by the pragmatic post-revolutionary leadership, 
with somé interesting exemptions in East-Germany.9 *During the period of reform, in 
those countries where reform has been initiated this institutional tradition served as 
a useful technique fór distancing the government from the communist ideology and 
lawlessness.
Much better known are the conservative continuities or structural remnants that 
thwarted proposed transformations during the course of the “constitutional revolution”. 
We cannot provide an exhaustive list of the structural obstructions to transformation 
bút somé of them must be mentioned here.
7 s.n. 86. p.
8 Charles H. Koch: The Advantage of the Civil Law Judicial Design as the Model fór Emerging 
Legal Systems, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 11.
9 Boros László, Fleck Zoltán, Gyulavári Ágnes, Die Beteiligung von Laien an dér Rechtspflege im
sozialistischen Ungarn, lus Commune Sonderhefte (Studien zűr Europaischen Rechtsgeschichte), 
Recht im Socialismus Bánd 2. Justizpolitik, Hrsg: Gerd Bender, Ulrich Fáik, Vittorio Klostermann, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1999, 147-199
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Despite somé legislative efforts during the first years following transformation, 
deregulation was only partly successful: the Hungárián legal system remained 
simultaneously over- and under-regulated, although many low-level decrees were 
annulled by legislation, and the Constitutional Court alsó took part of this process 
as a constitutional selector of the old legal system. Bút, as usual, large-scale 
transformation of the economy, building a democratic political environment, and 
generál modernization encouraged greater law-making activity and, as is well known, 
speed never serves quality and prudence. (As a law-making factory, Hungárián 
Parliament has often created regulations which were after a short time proved to be 
useless or have been modified several times. Technical faults made judges mad or 
severely skeptic about Parliament.) Despite the notable volume of deregulation, the 
number of legal norms in operation has enourmously expanded.10
From the perspective of constitutional stability and progress the effects of the 
pást on society might be more important, since this issue concerns the effectiveness 
of the legal system through its position in the norms and institutions of the country. 
Disregarding the remnants of attitudes and outlooks created by the earlier political 
system — the lack of good manners and decided lack of trust in the authorities 
— allowance should be made fór a particular form of backwardness, fór instance the 
mentality of legal staff, the professions and, especially the judiciary which had been 
directly involved with the function of State and law under communism.11 Quoting only 
one example: judges sitting on the upper courts often use a logic in cases of freedom 
of the press, which practically bán the critique of officialdom. In the eyes of these 
judges the hard critic of State institutions and bureaucrats is something abnormal.1 2
10 Invalidated legal norms in Hungary, 1990-2004
1990-2000 2000-2004
A c t o f Parliam ent 373 259
G ovem m en ta l decree 1248 1236
M inisteria l decree 3187 2810
Legal norms in operation in Hungary, 1990-2004 
1. Acts of Parliament
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
350 425 494 587 670 765 869 983 1054 1027 1148 1240 1299 1264 1381






11 Fleck Zoltán, Judicial independence and its environment in Hungary, in: Priban, Young, Roberts 
(eds.): Systems of Justice in Transformation, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003
12 Fleck Zoltán, Freedom of the press in the civil adjudication, in press
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As already seen in the European unification process, and alsó from a broader 
view of progress, it became clear after somé years that the proper application of the 
results of new legislation is more challenging than creating new rules.13
It would be too undemanding to State that humán rights, constitutional values, 
freedoms are nőt part of the legal culture, and we should nőt wait fór effective 
working in this respect. Such a statement is pure cultural pessimism, which can be 
overcome. Bút there are factual pitfalls, among other things, attached to the Creative 
application of the legal decrees, with the judicial application of the Constitution 
and constitutional values, and with the Wholesale bureaucratic positivism. This is 
because legal staff have been trained to apply the written law only, and to évadé 
any political interpretation of higher norms or values. At the same time we must be 
aware of the fact that this peculiarity of the law in Hungary had an important function 
in self-defence fór the judges under communism. Nevertheless the present State is 
in somé respects confusing in the West alsó, regarding perhaps the evaluation of 
judges’ work, bureaucratic pressures, and the ability of using European case law. In 
addition to these challenges the new democracies must face up to somé new- born 
misinterpretations, such as that of the independence of the judiciary, by which somé 
magistrates try to use this constitutional value as an ultimate defence against public 
criticism and as a safeguard against open debates on verdicts.
Because Hungary and somé other former communist countries — with different 
argumentation and causes — did nőt change the legal personnel, remnants of old 
attitudes could nőt be eliminated by simple administrative changes. Evén the former 
GDR, where scrutinizing legal professions was carried out on a large-scale, did nőt 
escape completely from the troubles, and the radical solution asked a considerable 
price as can be seen from a highly sophisticated portrayal of the events.14 The 
purging processes after one and a halt decades are nőt on the scene, bút waiting 
fór a generation shift seems alsó to be a misleading tactic. Evading the fashionable 
institutional pessimism I think that the implementation of somé new techniques of 
formai education fór the professionals is nőt the only valuable result of the earlier 
decade, bút it is the legal institutional environment itself that creates — albeit slowly 
— the proper functioning. When properly established, institutions are able to breed 
well functioning actors. We must go much further in praising the results than the line 
of reasoning indicated below.
“Administrative and court reform was nőt very successful during the first 
decade oftransition. Much time and money was invested with disappointing results 
overall. However, there are reasons fór hoping that investment was nőt altogether 
lost. Both the EU and the candidate countries have gained considerable experience 
in how and how nőt to promote this reform effectively. ”15
13 Frank Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, European Law 
Journal, Vol. 9. No. 3. pp. 288-315. According to a recent survey Hungárián judges practically do 
nőt refer to European Court's decisions. (Fundamentum, 2005/2.)
14 Inga Markovits, Imperfect Justice: An East-West Germán Diary, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995
15 Emmert, p. 315.
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The question of how to ensure the conformity of the legal practitioners, particularly 
in times of radical political transformations is nőt new in the history.16 Anewborn 
political régimé (following sharp political-ideological swings) ordinarily had to redefine 
its relationship to the legal staff. (In the Germán instance there were at least four 
good examples of this kind of recasting.) Because bringing in new laws and even 
introducing an extensive normative change is rarely sufficient to bring lawyers in line 
with the régimé, alternative measures usually have to be established fór ensuring 
conformity. According to Hubert Rottleuthner’s enumeration the arsenal ranges from 
legal education to disciplinary sanctions. Among the tremendous changes in Central 
European legal systems, somé are really suitable fór strengthening conformity, bút 
one should alsó take intő account the innate ability of the Continental judiciary of 
being able to conform to any regimes.
As fór legal training, the autonomy of the universities following democratization 
increased in importance, as did the law degree, thanks to the growing need fór lawyers 
in a markét economy and democracy. Instead of the State controlling entry to the study 
of law, faculties began to open their doors to ever increasing numbers of students 
and, consequently, to increasing amounts of money. Under communism less than a 
thousand qualified lawyers graduated from universities annually, because strict State 
regulation maximized the possible number of students. Following the system-change 
the social need fór lawyers has grown sharply, the number of law students in Hungary 
by the year 2002/2003 almost reached an unprecedented 18.000. In addition to the 
radical changes in the regulation of professions, the emergence of markét pressures 
had the most significant overall structural effects on the legal occupations.
The autonomy of legal Science departments at the universities alsó became 
limitless, as they continued in their tradition of doing nothing much more than complain 
about low wages, in the meantime seeking other more lucrative employment. In 
Hungary the actual decisions on recruitment of personnel, the career and remuneration 
of judges, as one of the most important tools in ensuring conformity with the radical 
reforms, were given to the administrative elite of the judiciary. Thus the higher courts 
and their presidents have strong possibilities of influencing lower ranking judges as 
well as carrying out judicial practice without effective external control. This situation has 
corrupted the selection of judges and made a new kind of contra- or biased selection.17 
Nőt only are formulas, informál binding opinions, legal and ethical measures, 
appellate or review instances the tools fór guaranteeing conformity, bút through these, 
guaranteeing the career expectations of lower ranking judges.
This last example illustrates that institutions matter; the necessity of preserving the 
institutionalist view is very clear.
16 Hubert Rottleuthner, The Conformity of the Legal Staff, in: Karlsson, Jonsson, Brynjarsdottir 
(eds.), Recht, Gerechtigkeit und dér Staat, Duncker & Humblot, Reykjavik, 1993
17 Badó Attila, Hungárián Lawyers in the Making: Selection Distortion after the Democratic 
Changes in Hungary (manuscript)
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Players, actors, roles: law yers as active  agents
Evén from the middle of rapid changes in numerous spheres, one can notice the 
worldwide transformations of legal professions during the last decades. Fór those 
societies that actively changed their political, economic and legal systems, these 
more generál transformations created the background and the context, and it is 
evident that the adjustment to a changing environment generates new challenges 
during the process of transformation. Despite the stability of the final values of these 
transformations (rule of law, rights, democratic way of doing things, etc.), the routes 
to these aims, and the institutions that could encourage the ultimate success are 
extremely shaky.
The intensive work carried out in building institutions in the post-communist 
countries lends considerable significance to pragmatic advisors, legislatures and other 
designers bút little effort has been given to a deeper understanding and analyses of 
the reál activities of the actors involved in these processes. From a legal sociological 
aspect the highly important players are those in the legal professions who nőt only 
helped to create new, or renovate old, institutions, bút continue to recreate them in 
their everyday functioning.
From our perspective the most important roles in the legal system are those which 
shape the institutional activity of the legal system. Judges, prosecutors, even priváté 
attorneys in a system of justice, law professors, academics in legal education, in 
constitutional court or working as ombudsmen, administrators, bureaucrats creating 
legal measures and administering legal issues.
Periods of rapid change are rarely advantageous fór analysis, bút we can safely 
assume that somé deeper scientific research would be very fitting in this case. This 
research should bravely cross the disciplinary limits using different social Sciences 
(history, social history, legal sociology, jurisprudence). The frame of scientific 
conceptualization of legal issues should extend traditional limits. This kind of trespass 
needs brevity and enterprise, although cross-bordering is by no means new in the 
social Sciences. Understanding the legal professions sociologically needs this shift in 
perspective, especially in the case of societies under the pressure of huge changes. 
As an evaluative summary of the traditional aspects of legal Science one can accept 
Terence Halliday’s argumentation:
“Both social Sciences and academic lawyers have directed much greater 
attention to the recruitment of lawyers, legal education, professional organization, and 
stratification of the profession than to its work and its wider institutional impact. Seldom 
do scholars treat lawyers as principals or agents of institutional design, constructing 
and maintaining generál markét institutions, State power, or civil society.”18
Of course there is no space here to run through the roots and results of the 
cross-disciplinary project, we can only give a brief account, with somé possible 
research topics.
18 Terence C. Halliday, Lawyers as Institution Builders: Constructing Markets, States, Civil Society, 
and Community, in: Sarat, Constable, Engel, Hans, Lawrence (eds.) Crossing Boundaries. 
Traditions and Transformations in Law and Society Research, Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston, 1998, p. 244.
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This fresh line, which assimilates various aspects from history and sociology, 
assumes the active role of lawyers, it conceptualizes them as agents, nőt only 
mirroring the peculiarities of society, economy or State, bút constituting the institutions 
in which they are embedded.
In the tieid of sociology of lawyers such issues as how lawyers control the markét 
and with what measures they can reach competitive advantages in a free markét 
has taken a dominant position and reached its peak in Richard Abel’s monumental 
works.19 The problems of markét behavior, the control over training and admission to 
the professions, the role of the State in regulating working conditions were certainly 
decisive at the moment of transformation of the State in to the new democracies. 
Bút it should be more challenging to investigate the market-creation process, while 
lawyers are playing fundamental roles in designing markét institutions, forming the 
non-economic foundations of economic activity. They consistently do their jobs in the 
interests of Capital or big business by finding new paths fór their clients, constituting 
new forms of commodity exchange, insurances, etc. They are the inventors of 
institutions and “symbol traders” : “Lawyers invent relationships. This is their special 
skill, their indispensable contribution to Capital.”20
So the markét as a relatively new force in the old Eastern Bloc does nőt only change 
the setting of the professional work, as one can see, fór example, in the case of the 
attorneys who must face strong markét competition after years of security made by a 
numerus clausus. At the end of the 1980’s there were about 2000 practicing attorneys 
in Hungary, a decade later there were no less than 8000. This enormous growth of 
lawyers, and the huge increase in students following a legal education is symptomatic 
of all the new democracies in Central Europe.21 As a consequence of the “privatization” 
of this profession after somé decades of exclusivity ensured by the State, and due to 
the strengthened markét pressure, attorneys are widely differentiated. Additionally they 
have had to face the big law and counseling firms of the West that could now enter this 
new, unregulated markét. Bút lawyers are by no means only pure victims of the market- 
economy, they have proved to be successful in gathering competitive advantages while 
themselves creating the conditions. The markét is created by lawyers in different ways: 
during the first years of the transformation (and in Hungary even somé years before 
the political change) they were reformist advisers of the legislator, even advising in the 
political role of deputies or chief bureaucrats. The privatization of the State property after 
somé years of spontaneity (spontaneity was an euphemistic, bút widely used concept 
on the unregulated, sometimes anarchistic events) and other types of economic 
regulations, brought about a set of creations and somé new markét subjects and 
jurisdictions, new definitions of the legal practitioner, subject (Corporation), inventing a 
new kind of economic citizenship. It is highly important and decisive that the economic 
reform regulation, which created most of the markét players by constructing a new kind
19 Richard L. Ábel, Philip S. C. Lewis, Lawyers in Society, Vol. 1-3., University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1988-89
20 Maureen Cain, The symbol traders, in: Cain, Harrington (eds.) Lawyers in a Postmodern World, 
Open University Press, Buckingham, 1994, p. 33.




of economic legal personality, took piacé before the system-change and this fact alsó 
gave strong dynamism to other legal transformations. After the first democratic election 
in Hungary, bút alsó elsewhere, the Constitutional Court arrived on the scene as a chief 
designer and tried to reshape the social rights of the citizens, amongst other things. This 
activity sometimes seriously hindered the further reforms of the hereditary sickness of 
such institutions as the welfare system. This logic was openly present in the fate of the 
welfare reform in Hungary: in 1995 Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the 
cutbacks of the socialist welfare system.22
During the reform, and through the creation of the new markét institutions, lawyers 
alsó reshaped the markét morality, they constructed somé relevant concepts, such as 
dirty money, money laundering, corruption; this adventure seems very dubious and 
risky because these concepts are strongly value-burdened. Evén so, this creativity 
touched the legitimacy of the new system and gave legal forms to capitalism.
As fór the role and function of the State in the legal profession, it is widely known 
that in Europe and mostly in the Continental civil law world, professionalization was 
guided by government, States intervened strongly and circumscribed the conditions 
of lawyer’s work. The latecomers of Central- and Eastern Europe have experienced 
all the burdens of this type of State activity: the sometimes brutal force of the 
modernizers. It cannot be denied that lawyers under totalitarianism served as mere 
servants of State interest, and sometimes even as protagonists of the State ideology. 
Bút it should be clear that in those systems, and especially under socialism, lawyers 
played a limited role, their work as channeling and transforming Central requirements 
was simply unimportant, while Central command had a direct effect on society, at least 
theoretically. This alsó means that when the command economy was forced to reform 
from the end of the 1960’s, the lawyers’ role turnéd outto  be more important because 
indirect regulation of the economy did nőt mean liberalization only, bút regulation 
through legal means. This demanded the attention of well-educated lawyers during 
the creation and realization of legal regulations.
In the course of creating a moderate (limited) State, defining citizens rights, the 
writing of a constitution, lawyers in their role as participants of the round-table talks 
effectively formed the shape of the new democracies, continuing the long tradition of 
reformist “political lawyering” or lawyers’ participation in high politics. In fact, Central 
European transformations were largely concluded through constitutional measures and 
this feature gave the processes a peaceful, smooth character. The important contribution 
of lawyers in this process should alsó be recognized. Along with all compromises and 
faults, revolutionary law-making surely makes mistakes. In everyday practice different 
law professionals create and recreate legitimacy fór the State and rule of law, from this 
perspective a judge or a prosecutor becomes inevitable state-stabilizers.
In forming markét institutions lawyers have the function of giving rational 
legitimacy to priváté interests, since they — in post-socialist countries — have 
become defenders of individual interests after long decades of working under official
22 András Sajó, Socialist welfare schemes and constitutional adjudication in Hungary, in J. Priban 
and J Young (eds.), The Rule of Law in Central Europe, Ashgate, 160-78.
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communitarianism. (or at least under such a system where privatism was politically 
illegitimate). In influencing State affairs lawyers have the duty to form democratic 
“rules of the д а те ” and, even far more complicated, making the new democratic 
rules a natural element of social life. Their firm responsibility is to form a constitutional 
culture. Instead of complaining about the lack of this cultural background the law 
profession must design constitutional and legal values and legitimize them.
Bút it is well known that to ensure the stability of these structures somé social 
preconditions are necessary, the most generál concept of these is civil society itself.
In the sociology of lawyers the trendy view in recruitment to the legal fields has 
been set in a traditional eláss perspective, in which lay the social position of law 
professionals and its consequences. Inequality during recruitment and the level of 
meritocracy were the Central issues. This research perspective should be continued: 
today the inner conservatism of lawyers, the structural isomorphism of the ruling 
eláss or dominant strata and professions continue to leave room fór investigation. 
The social background of lawyers nowadays is a far more vitai topic since different 
kinds of Capital and their fruitful exchanges have proved to be important regulators 
of the social composition of various professions. Students from lower status families 
are at a disadvantage when attempting to reach the most prosperous careers. This 
kind of inequality, despite the official positive diserimination in the socialist period, 
and despite the democratic rush toward meritocracy in a democratic setting, 
remains unbroken. What is new is the relatively high salaries of the non-market 
legal professions (that do nőt compare with their Western colleagues), such as 
the judge and prosecutor, which are highly valued symbolically following the 
transformation to democracy, and somé years later this position has been turnéd 
to financial advantages. Thus, beside the growing pressure on the markét of the 
professionals, the regulation of judges’ careers became one of the most disputed 
and problematic tasks from a sociological perspective. This was largely due to the 
administrative elite retaining authority fór this issue by keeping to its autonomous 
administration of the judiciary.
In addition to this view, a much more dynamic relationship has alsó emerged, 
where lawyers’ participation in creating civility, and a civil society is a relevant task. 
Lawyers play a variety of relevant roles in the reconstruction of civil society in the 
new democracies, nőt only in connection with their own professional associations, 
assemblies, trade-unions, bút attorneys are strongly involved de jure and de facto in 
every voluntary association.
Somé historical investigations have shown that in Francé, before the 
Revolution, attorneys, sometimes in collaboration with judges, took part in the 
formation of an autonomous public, in redefinition of the sovereign authority 
based over the generál public. Across the 18th century, lawyers as the voice of 
the nation effectively monopolized the language of rights and followed symbolic 
struggles against absolutism.23
23 Dávid A. Bell, Lawyers and Citizens, The making of a political elite in old régimé Francé. Oxford 
University Press, New York, Oxford, 1994, Lucien Karpik, Lawyers and Politics in Francé, 1814- 
1950: the State, the markét, and the public, Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 13. No. 4. pp. 707-736.
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During the highly important and formative round-table talks in central-Europe, 
attorneys’ roles were decisive since they effectively shaped the agenda of the talks 
and formed the language of political argumentation. Without the involvement of 
lawyers, attorneys and legal scientists alike the “revolution” would nőt have become 
legally driven and peacefully constitutional. By creating the formai legal environment 
of legislative acts and legalistic argumentation and by articulating the language 
behind this, they created the solid base fór constitutional legitimacy. However natural 
rights discourse is alsó incorporated intő the constitutions, and it did nőt lose its 
anti-formalist, anti-positivist edge that was such an important weapon in the hands 
of dissidents arguing fór ethical progress.24 After consolidation of the legal system 
“natural law infection” as a political approach serves the populists more as a basis of 
the criticisms of rigid, technocratic formai law.
The task in forming legal tradition by shaping institutions and discourse is well 
known, bút poorly implemented in the sociology of lawyers as the function of diffusion 
of values and concepts stemming from constitutionality, rule of law and rights. The 
discourse of rights and liberalism, the logic of opposing the State with the help of 
individual rights revealing of pre-revolutionary Francé was missing in Germany, where 
lawyers defined their calling (Beruf) in institutionalizing procedures and Rechtsstaat.25 
In Central Europe intellectuals had always played crucial roles in social changes as 
enlightened or revolutionary substitutions of the bourgeoisie. When politics turnéd 
to strong feudal conservatism as in the interwar period, this role faded before a new 
wave of modernization. Such oscillations strongly touched upon lawyers in their 
professional roles, bút the strongest impact was that of state-socialism with its anti- 
legalist ideology to begin with, coupled with its ongoing hypocrisy.
It is reasonable to assume that through post-communist transformations, 
following many years of restricted importance, Hungárián lawyers had to accept both 
challenges: positing themselves somewhere between the French (strong emphasis 
on individual rights as defense against State authority) and Germán (more energy 
intő forming strict legal procedures, strengthening rational bureaucracy) models. 
Law-makers widely transformed the written law in the interests of a markét economy 
and the rule of law. The judges, in their highly complex situation, guarded the rights 
of individuals, ensured the stability of civil relations, and strengthened the legitimacy 
of the legal way of handling disputes. Attorneys as liberal advocates, among others, 
identified themselves with the interests of the clients and thus legalized social wants. 
Bút every legal professional stressed the legal formalism, underlined the limits of State 
action, and gave importance to legal tools in generál. Before the transformation to rule 
of law, dissidents’ argumentation in Central Europe emphasized civic virtue and morál 
authority against communist rule: in their minds the law should be used as a value- 
burdened political tool in favor of the oppressed. Bút this morally valuable activity 
could nőt be expected from professional lawyers because of their organizational
24 Jirí Pribán, The Concept of Legality and Legitimation Demands in the Post-Communist Czech 
Society, in: Febbrajo, Nelken, Olgiati (eds.) Social Processes and Patterns of Legal Control, 
European Yearbook in the Sociology of Law, Giuffre, Milano, 2001
25 Kenneth F. Ledford, From General Estate to Special Interest: Germán Lawyers, 1878-1933, New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 1996
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bonds, educational biases and ideological constraints; only dissidents standing 
outside official placements might be vulnerable to this call. From this perspective the 
new system is far less heroic.
The task of lawyers to settle disputes and encourage consensus forces them to 
share the responsibility of a developing community. It is nőt only a Durkheimian logic on 
professional communities as social integrators bút an empirical experience alsó in family 
disputes, small-claim personal suits, and on the political, cultural activities of lawyers in 
small towns as local experts. This latter activity extends the strict limits of “lawyering” .
In societies where the autonomy of voluntary associations based on the interests of 
professional groups was forbidden fór very many years, the shift toward community-like 
control of the corporate boundaries is demanding. Nevertheless different new challenges 
have emerged: in the case of attorneys markét pressure has grown enormously, judges 
must face heavy work-loads and need to agitate fór salary increases, bút in this case the 
associational life and strength has remained underdeveloped.
While attorneys were able to shape somé aspects of the markét institutions 
themselves during the transformation and, with the help of somé political Capital, 
they could stand up fór their individual interests. Judges and prosecutors are nőt in 
positions to articulate their needs individually. These public officers are forced to remain 
aloof from political argument, only the administrative elite is permitted to speak about 
professional interests. Nevertheless, the issue of salary is highly politicized, although it 
remains in the hands of official representatives only. A third way of defending personal 
interests was chosen by public notaries, they successfully lobbied fór strong legal 
restrictions on admission, thus their offices can be obtained only on a hereditary basis, 
they have managed to ensure that they can évadé all competition.
Every professional association must соре with a new situation in which the State 
cannot automatically defend their interests, concurrence appeared and conquered 
authority and clients, public voices openly criticize professional activities, divergent 
interests questioned the cohesion of community.
Despite the tremendous changes that must be undertaken by the legal professions 
without the advantage of comprehensive sociological research, a more dynamic 
account should be of value in completing the scene of the sociology of lawyers in 
which professionals are active agents. Lawyers now have a particular understanding 
of the formative years of the new democracies as they work at institution-building 
activities, when they are creating and upholding nőt only formai structures, bút alsó 
institutions. They are effectively taking part in value-formation, socialization, and a set 
of activities concerning civil society and community in a wider sense.
Social engineering as a realistic image of lawyers’ tasks can clearly be seen in 
an age of massive change. Our time is without doubt suitable fór piacing significant 
questions before legal professionals, since they are key players in a set of social 
changes worldwide and in the post-communist countries in particular. Unfortunately 
we are far from being rich in empirical sociological research, however the theoretical 
shift that could help in these investigations took piacé during the last decade. It is, of 
course, true that cross-disciplinary researches, which should be used in this case, are 
among the most complex and time-consuming scientific activities. Flere I intended to 
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feature deriving from the geographical conditions and historical-cultural ties of 
Hungary, the adaptation and interpretation of the achievement of Austrian and Germán 
jurisprudence are to be mentioned. Secondly, the dual natúré of the legal thinking 
of this region of Europe is stressed, which comprises a tendency towards legal 
conservatism and an uptodate interpretation of the most current legal philosophical 
trends. The most outstanding Hungárián lawyers have been characterized by the 
latter specific feature.
The mid-1980s signalled the revival of Hungárián legal traditions. By this time the 
Soviet type Marxism has lost ground in legal literature. Further confirmation of the 
previously unquestionable paradigms have nőt pút researchers’ existence intő risk 
any longer. Fór jurists concerned with legal theory, it was only a choice of values to 
decide which paradigm would be fundamental fór them. One of the forms of finding 
new ways was provided by studies in Hungárián traditions of legal thinking before the 
year of change, which were carried out by the concerned researchers still alive and 
the younger generations who view this kind of tradition as a neglected value and take 
responsibility fór the rehabilitation of their predeccessors’ work.
Three great periods-natural law, legal positivism and Neo-Kantianism-are to be 
distinguished in the history of legal philosophy in Hungary up to the mid-twentieth 
century, mostly following the traditions of legal thinking in Europe. The attitűdé of 
legal positivism came intő full power in the Hungárián literature of jurisprudence with 
the work of Ágost Pulszky (1846-1901) in the last decades of the 19th century.2 In his 
early works Pulszky was mainly concerned with the theories of More, Bacon, Hobbes 
and Locke, the classical representatives of English social philosophy. Later in his 
career Pulszky focused on the ethnological attitűdé represented by Lubbock, Waitz, 
McLennan, Tylor, Morgan and Maine. In 1875 Pulszky completed the translation 
of Henry Maine’s Ancient Law. He alsó attached—similarly to his contemporary, 
Friedrick Pollock3—over a hundred-page notes of their own scientific value to Maine’s 
work.4 Afterwards he wrote a critical review of Herbert Spencer’s philosophy, who 
was considered as innovator of the contemporary social scientific thinking. His major 
work titled The Theory of Civil Law and Society was published in Hungárián in 
1885, and in English in 1888.5 Inspite of a favourable reaction to his work, he was nőt 
able to achieve his main goal, i.e. to enter and be accepted in the English scientific 
public life. However, Pulszky’s work, according to Hungárián legal philosophy, is still
2 Pulszky's main works of jurisprudence: A római jog, s az újabbkori jogfejló'dés [Román law and 
moder legal development], Pest, 1869; ‘Az angol jogbölcselet történetéhez' [On history of english 
legal philosophy], in Budapesti Szemle, 1875, 126-148; A jog és állambölcsészet alaptanai [The 
fundamental doctrine of philosophy of law and State], Budapest, 1885; A jog és állambölcsészet 
feladatai [The tasks of philosophy of law and State], Budapest, 1888.
3 Pollock, F., Introduction and Notes to Sir Henry Maine’s Ancient Law, London, 1908.
4 Maine, H., A jog őskora, összeköttetése a társadalom alakulásának történetével, s viszonya 
az újkori eszmékhez [Ancient law, its connections with the early history of society and its relation 
to modern ideas], (A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia megbízásából fordította, bevezette és 
jegyzetekkel kísérte Pulszky Ágost [Ágost Pulszky translated, wrote introduction and notes on 
Hungárián Academy of Sciences's authority]), Budapest, 1875.
5 Pulszky, Á., The Theory of Civil Law and Society, London, 1888.
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fundamental, since the publication of this book Iáid the cornerstone of legal positivism 
in Hungary. In his work Pulszky considered Maine’s comparative-historical attitűdé 
and his theoretical theses were based on Spencer’s ideas.
Pulszky’s achievement is considered a milestone in Hungárián scientific life, since 
his major work established ground tor legal positivism in Hungary. In his positivist view 
he accepted ‘life interest’, determining the idea of evolution, as a driving force as well 
as ‘theory of activity’ reflecting the classical liberal attitűdé to law, which claims that 
the greatest individual freedom, ‘possibility fór acting’ is to be ensured by the State 
and law. Pulszky in due time realised the importance of social, economic and political 
changes at the end of the 19th century, and alsó their role in the scope of the activity 
of State. In his view, the increasing role of State was mostly apparent in the changes of 
economic conditions, in social policy and health service. Clearly perceiving tendencies 
in the development of contemporary capitalism, he outlined the idea of early social 
State beyond the classical liberal theoretical trend. He alsó paid attention to the conflict 
of nationalities beyond the boundaries of contemporary State. His work has influenced 
several branches of social Science, in this way Pulszky’s oeuvre is recognised nőt only 
by philosophy of law bút by theory of State, politics and sociology as well. From the 
end of 1880s his active political role turnéd him away from Science therefore his life- 
work is considered incomplete. Outstanding representatives of Hungárián progress 
after the turn of the century were among his students, fór example Gyula Pikler and 
Bódog Somló, who later accomplished significant works of legal philosophy and Oszkár 
Jászi—politician and scientist—who, as bourgeois radicalists, were fighting fór a new, 
modern, 20th-century Hungary devoid of any feudal constraints. They believed that a 
wide scope of social, political and legal modernisation can base the establishment of a 
Western-European model of evolution.
The positivist doctrine reached the peak of its history in Hungary with the work of 
Gyula Pikler (1864-1937) at the turn of the century.6 In his early works Pikler devoted 
attention to the inner contradictions of Spencer’s theory against the intervention of 
State. Pikler did nőt consider Spencer’s classical liberal attitűdé, which was based 
on biological conceptions as acceptable, and he emphasized the need fór increased 
State intervention fór the sake of society. Pikler’s later works are all characterized by a 
discussion with Spencer whose theories he, on one hand, analyses fór the support of 
his own theories, bút on the other hand, he criticises and evaluates them. Spencer’s 
influence is revealed in his theory of the evolution of law, or in his theory of ‘discretion’. 
He believes that people act nőt by instincts bút by purposeful discretion, and according 
to this, people realise and develop norms and institutions satisfying their needs more 
and more perfectly. In this way people establish society, institutions and law which are 
considered rational and purposeful by them. The first ones, who recognise purposeful 
discretion, are the most outstanding members of a society, the so called educated 
classes. From the 191 Os Pikler was mainly concerned with biological and psychological 
reasons behind the phenomena of society. Consequently, he became estranged
6 Pikler's main works of jurisprudence: Bevezető a jogbölcseletbe [Introduction to philosophy of 
law], Budapest, 1892; Az emberi egyesületek és különösen az állam keletkezése és fejlődése 
[The origin and development of State in particular], Budapest, 1897; A jog keletkezéséről és 
fejlődéséről [About the origin and development of law], Budapest, 1897.
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from questions of law and legal philosophy, and while changing his field of interest in 
Science, he carried out experiments in psychophysics and sense physiology.
At the turn of the 20th-century Bódog Somló7 (1871-1920) is the most reputable 
representative of Hungárián legal philosophy whose oeuvre greatly contributed to the 
development of the Neo-Kantian legal philosophy, the dominant trend prevailing in 
Central Europe et the time, a development that eventually resulted in modernisting 
the legal scholarship and theoretical thought in law in Hungary. Somló is a classic 
authority of social theorising in Hungary. His professional activity, relatively limited in 
time, spanning about a quarter of a century, can be divided intő two phases.
The first period of activity is characterised by the unconditioned acceptance and re- 
assertion of Spencer’s doctrines, concomitant with personal adherence to his one-time 
professor Gyula Pikler’s theoretical approach based on natural Science and psychology 
within the framework of a slightly materiálist version of the philosophy of history. In 
co-operation and co-authoring with Pikler,8 Somló focused his attention mainly on 
sociological problems taken from a naturalistic perspective. During this period Somló 
became-together with Ágost Pulszky and Gyula Pikler-the third outstanding figure 
determining the future of sociological positivist philosophy of law in Hungary.
The second phase of Somló’s scholarly career is defined by his Neo-Kantian 
turn, heralding maybe the most prosperous period that has ever existed in Hungárián 
legal philosophy which-reprezented mostly by his successor, Gyula Moór and, later, 
the renown legal sociologist Barna Horváth-lasted until World War Two, when the 
Soviet military occupation replaced local traditions with ‘Soviet-type’ Marxist theory 
as an all-substitutive panacea. Despite that fór early Somló legal philosophy and legal 
sociology were equal instanding, his Neo-Kantian conceptualisation led to revision 
and separation of these inter-connnected areas of legal inquiry. The outcome of this 
period founded and substantianed Somló’s scholarly reputation in legal philosophy in 
Hungary and especially in German-speaking territories. Nowadays he is duly regarded 
as a classic authority of Neo-Kantian philosophising on law in Central Europe, among 
thinkers like Rudolf Stammler, Gustav Radbruch, Hans Kelsen and Alfréd Verdross.
In his writings published around the turn of the century, he criticised the scholarly 
ideals established by his contemporaries, from the perspective of natural-science- 
inspired positivism and evolutionism. His positivist theoretical outlook was all the 
way through complemented by scholarly interest and personal involvement in public 
affairs. One of his major works characteristic of this period is the book-size treatise
7 Somló's main works of jurisprudence: Állami beavatkozás és individualizmus [State 
intervention and individualism] Budapest, 1900; Jogbölcseleti előadások [Lectures in legal 
philosophy] Kolozsvár, 1906; ‘Masstábe zűr Bewertung des Rechts', in Archív für Rechts- und 
Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 3 (1909-10) 508-522; ‘A jog értékmérői' [Value standards of law], in 
Huszadik Század, 11 (1910) 1-14; ‘Das Wertproblem', in Zeitschrift für die Philosophie und 
philosophische Kritik, (1912) 66-95; A szokásjog' [Customary law], in Farkas Lajos emlékkönyv, 
Kolozsvár, 1914, 339-369; A helyes jog elméletéről [On the theory of right-law theory] Kolozsvár 
1914; Juristische Grundlehre, Leipzig, 1917. [2. ed: 1927, and reprinted: 1973]; Jogbölcsészet 
[Legal philosophy] Budapest, 1920.




on Állami beavatkozás és individualizmus [State intervention and individualism] 
published in 1900. The greater role the State was to play and the formation of monopol 
capitalism both demanded reformulation and adaptation of the respective roles and 
institutions of law, State and politics.
From the early 1930s, in the prevailing Neo-Kantian philosophy Barna FIorváth9 
(1896-1973) created a new colour in the Flungarian traditions of legal philosophy. In 
his view of legal theory, which he preferred calling legal sociology or even ‘pure legal 
sociology’ according to Flans Kelsen’s terminology, his originality was mainly revealed 
in his so called synoptic attitűdé and the functionally related processional legal view. 
He has created something new by conforming two paradigms that were considered 
antagonistic in contemporary legal philosophy. A parrallel existence of Neo-Kantian 
(Lask, Rickert, Verdross, Kelsen, etc.) and pragmatic-empirical attitudes (Pound, 
American realism, psychologism, etc.) and their relation to each other was regarded 
as a breakthorough nőt only in Flungarian bút alsó in European legal thinking. The 
consideration of these two influential paradigms is nőt by chance. While between the 
two World Wars Neo-Kantian paradigm is to be considered evident in Middle Europe, 
pragmatism appeared as a new idea mainly in the Flungarian public view of legal 
philosophy. Florváth’s susceptibility to empirism can be attributed to two reasons. On 
one hand, he as practising lawyer realised contradictions in norms and reality, which 
was neglected by Neo-Kantian philosophy. On the other hand, during his journey to 
England in the laté 1920s, Anglo-Saxon legal culture made a great impact on him. 
His connection with Leonard Flobhouse, English sociologist, and Moris Ginsberg, 
his student, influenced the elaboration of his procedúrái legal attitűdé since FIorváth 
adapted from their views the division of four types of social evolution. After coming 
home from England, FIorváth reported in a number of papers on the achievements 
of both American and English jurisprudence. The experiences and impressions he 
gained in England ürgéd him to complete the history of English legal philosophy.
The synoptic method elaborated by FIorváth is an original interpretation of one of 
the fundamental questions of Neo-Kantian legal philosophy, namely the connection 
between value and reality. The most significant representatives of ‘contemporary’ 
Flungarian philosophy of law, including Moór, Somló and FIorváth, all concerned 
themselves with finding a solution to this problem. Florváth’s starting point was the 
essence of legal activity, and considered law as a pattern of thoughts in a judge’s
9 Horváth's main works of jurisprudence: ‘ Die Idee dér Gerechtigkeit', in Zeitschrift für öffentliches 
Recht, 7, 1928, 508-544; Természetjog és pozitivizmus' [Natural law and legal positivism], 
in Társadalomtudomány, 8, 1928, 212-247; ‘Gerechtigkeit und Wahrheit', in Internationale 
Zeitschrift für Theorie des Rechts, 4, 1929, 1-54; ‘Die Gerechtigkeitslehre dér Vorsokratiker', 
in Studi Filosofico-Giuridici dedicati a Giorgo Del Vecchio, Modena, 1930, 336-372; Die 
Gerechtigkeitslehre des Aristoteles, Szeged, 1931; ‘Hegel und das Recht', in Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht, 12, 1932, 52-89; Bevezetés a jogtudományba [Introduction to jurisprudence], 
Szeged, 1932; Rechtssoziologie. Probleme des Geselschaftslehre und dér Geschichtslehre des 
Recht, Berlin-Grunewald, 1934; ‘Sociologie juridique et Théorie Processuelle du droit', in Archives 
de Philosophie du droit etde Sociologie Juridique, 5,1935,181-242; A jogelmélet vázlata [Sketch 
of legal theory], Szeged, 1937; ‘DerSinn dér Utopie', in Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 20, 1940, 
198-230; ‘Prolegomena zűr Soziologie', in Archív für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 37,1943, 50- 
67; Angol jogelmélet [English legal theory], Budapest, 1943.
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mind, which is nothing else in this way bút a ‘reflexive theoretical product’. The 
procedure by a lawyer becomes synoptic through his applying a legal case to a legal 
norm, and at the same time, vica versa, relating a legal norm to a legal case. The 
lawyer, therefore, relates normative matters of fact to reál matters of fact. In order to 
do this job, the lawyer needs a knowledge of facts selected according to legal rules, 
and alsó a knowledge of laws selected according to matters of fact. While a practising 
lawyer focuses his attention mainly on a legal case, a theoretical lawyer concentrates 
on statutes of law, bút both consider the legal case and the law at the same time.
According to Horváth’s processional legal attitűdé, closely related to his synoptic 
method, law cannot simply be regarded as norm bút as an abstract behaviourial 
pattern and relating actual behaviour, or in other words, a connection between norm 
and behaviour, which is the procedure itself. Procedure is the ‘genus proximum’ of 
law. That is to say, a continuous relation (of synoptic structure) of a legal case to the 
legal norm will create a procedúrái process. In Horváth’s opinion, law as the most 
developed social procedure establishes the most advanced stage of procedures by 
establishing the most developed procedúrái institution.
Horváth’s role lies in the fact that traditional German-Austrian ties of the 20th 
century Neo-Kantian Hungárián legal philosophical thoughts were ‘tailored’ by 
him through transferring Anglo-Saxon theories of jurisprudence and created new 
perspectives fór further development in Hungárián legal theory. Regretfully, the 
Second World War and the following political changes forced him to emigrate in 1949 
and there he did nőt have the opportunity to continue developing his theory.10 1
József Szabó11 (1909-1992) was a prominent representative of the gitted and 
promising generation, who achieved brilliant careers during the Second World War, 
and who were involved in the intellectual and scientific renewal of the country after 
the war. After graduation he became acquainted with Barna Horváth, founder of 
school and an exceptional personality of Hungárián legal philosophy. Horváth’s 
personality and his legal philosophical approach representing the influence of Anglo- 
Saxon jurisprudence and legal culture gave rise to Szabó’s enthusiasm. It was the 
period in the Hungárián legal philosophical thinking when, besides the achievements 
of Austrian, Germán and French legal philosophy, those of English and American 
jurisprudence were alsó considered.
10 Horváth's works from the 50s and 60s: ‘Between Legal Realism and Idealism', in Northwestern 
University Law Review, 48 (1954) 639-713; ‘Ftights of Mán: Due Process of Law and Exces de 
Pouvoir', in: The American Journal of Comparative Law, 4 (1955) 539-573; ‘Field Law and Law 
Field', in Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 8 (1957) 44-81; ‘Morál, Recht und 
Politik', in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 14 (1963) 218-252; ‘Comparative 
Conflicts Law and the Conceptof Changing Law', in The American Journal of Comparative Law, 15 
(1966-67) 136-158; ‘Twilight of Government of Laws', in Archív für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 
64 (1968) 1-26.
11 Szabó's main works of jurisprudence: A jog alapjai [The foundations of law], Budapest, 
1938; A jogászi gondolkodás bölcseleté [Philosophy of lawyer's thinking], Szeged, 1941; ‘Hol 
az igazság? A bírói lélektan problémái' [Where is the justice? Problems of judge's psychology], 
in Társadalomtudomány, 22, 1942, 1, 1-55; ‘Wahrheit, Wert und Symbol im Rechte', in Archív für 
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 37, 1943, 101-121; ‘Dér Rechtsbegriff in einer neutralistischen 
Beleuchtung', in Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffenliches Recht, 1, 1948, 3, 291-331.
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As a result of Barna Horváth’s aim to establish a school, the ‘school of Szeged’ 
was founded, and it included, besides Szabó, István Bibó, who later abandoned legal 
philosophy, and alsó Tibor Vas, who became Marxist in the 1950s and renounced 
the mentality of the school. Szabó’s legal philosophical thinking bears the strongest 
marks of the master’s irradiant influence. He began to elaborate his independent legal 
philosophical doctrine in the laté 1930s. He was alsó deeply involved in issues on 
constitutional and International laws.
In his writings on legal philosophy Szabó attempts to discredit the Neo-Kantian 
model by using the outcomes of criticism, according to Dávid Hume, and the 
American legal realism. Szabó, in his works published in the early 1940s, attempted to 
create a ‘neo-realistic’ approach to the concept of law. Applying the method common 
in Anglo-Saxon professional literature, he modelled the essence of legal thinking 
with describing legal cases. With this kind of approach, he seemed to discover a 
number of similar features between English and Hungárián ‘traditional’ legal attitudes. 
Citing the ideas of Jerome Frank, Edward Robinson and Thurman Arnold, the most 
outstanding personalities of American legal realism, Szabó abandoned belief in legal 
security, which was, in his opinion, revived by a faulty logical philosophy of law. In 
his theory he alsó used Frank’s doctrine of ‘fact-sceptics’ and ‘rule-sceptics’. Szabó 
claimed that in law enforcement it is nőt merely the legal norms one is to consider 
when looking fór justice, since the statement of facts is as important a precondition 
fór a righteous judgement as the interpretation of the corresponding law. He believed 
that legal decisions are influenced by ‘psychological circumstances’.
When reading Szabó’s works, one can clearly perceive the ideas of American 
legal realism. At that time, in the early 1940s, this kind of theory was considered rather 
exceptional in the Hungárián literature of legal philosophy. The influence exerted by 
the classical representatives of legal realism is undeniable. When appreciating Szabó’s 
work one can suggest that, in a similar way to the evaluation of Horváth’s work, he 
alsó gave particular pragmatic explanations to the classical Neo-Kantian problems. 
Doing so, he created the possibility fór a prolific interrelation of two legal cultures, and 
abolished the previous one-sided Austrian and Germán orientation in the Hungárián 
legal philosophical thinking. This is considered very important even if we sometimes 
come across rather eclectic explanations. Neither the master nor his student is 
an exception to this. Regretfully, however, Szabó was nőt able to work out further 
systematic explanations to his theory of legal philosophy called ‘neo-realistic’.
During the after-war years he was involved in reorganising the legal faculty of the 
university in Szeged. After the ‘decisive year’ (1949) like the reputation of many of 
his contemporaries, his reputation was alsó ruined. After his long imprisonment, with 
a short interruption after the revolution in 1956, Szabó lived in intellectual exile fór a 
number of decades. Somé of his papers and reviews were published only abroad. 
Only the last years of his life, after his restitution, brought him the opportunity to be 
involved in the professional public life of the country fór a brief period.
A key precondition fór us fór being included in the European scientific life again 
is to know our traditions in legal philosophy and to apply all the research finds 
that our predeccessors have accumulated. However, we alsó have to be careful 
about fragmented oeuvres and they are to be compared to the scientific level of the 
concerned period. If we realise that there is a lack of original ideas and the theories
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only belong to the second line, we have to express this. On the other hand, however, 
we should be proud of what is valuable even today.
Finally, we must clarify that, from the end of the last century, Hungárián legal 
philosophical thinking have supported the bourgeois transformation and the 
establishment of a modern civil society, according to the demand fór modernisation of 
the society. Ágost Pulszky, Gyula Pikler, Bódog Somló, Barna Horváth, József Szabó 
and their students have become fighting representatives of Hungárián progress 
and they visioned a modern 20th-century Hungary. In this ambition a great role can 
be attributed to the ‘empirical State’, which is the driving force of modernisation, 
to the realisation of what kind of development can satisfy the needs of society, to 
‘correct law’ required fór achieving the goals, to the investigation of the natúré of law 
supporting the régimé, and alsó to the comparison of empirical reality and the related 
norms, and to everything that can provide the widest scope of freedom in the Kantian 
view. This üst could be continued bút even so we might perceive what kind of ambition 
our predeccessors had taken upon themselves. Although they could nőt provide a 
safe recipe bút they have established the starting-points fór us, since even today we 
often face the same problems and we do nőt have divergent goals, though we tend 
to achieve them by drawing on different paradigms.
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■  Attila Badó*
Reforming the Hungárián lay justice system
In Hungary, like almost anywhere in the world, lay justice is 
a constantly recurring topic in the reflections on the judiciary. 
Since somé regard administering justice as a profession, there 
has been a continuous discussion whether lay participation is 
needed in addition to or instead of professional courts. The 
present study does nőt aim at taking part in the academic 
debate on the necessity of lay participation. One of the reasons 
fór this is that, in our view, no legal institution can be judged 
taken out from the particular historical context, legal system 
or structure of jurisdiction. Fór instance, it might prove to be 
difficult to argue against the jury if it plays an important political 
role in the independence movement of a nation and defies the 
repressive power through its verdicts. However, it might prove 
to be difficult to argue fór the jury if it functions primarily as a 
means of repressing ethnic minorities in a certain éra.
We will discuss a particular form of lay justice, which is 
present alsó in Hungary, by scrutinizing the dysfunction due to 
the peculiarities of the Hungárián society and jurisdiction. The 
reason fór this investigation is that, in our opinion, in Hungary 
there is a large gap between the intention expressed by the law 
and the everyday practice concerning this institution, established 
in other countries as well. We would like to emphasize, 
however, that we would like to avoid any statements that 
could be interpreted as the generál critique of this type of lay 
participation. We are convinced that under the same rules, bút 
in a different social setting, and under different implementation 
of law, the same institution could very well function efficiently. 
We alsó claim that there is an urgent need fór the reform of the 
Hungárián lay justice system.
* Szegedi Tudományegyetem , ÁJ К Jogbölcseleti és Jogszociológiai 
Tanszék (University of Szeged, Department of Philosophy and Sociology 
of Law) Address: 6726 Szeged, Rákóczi tér 1. E-mail: bado@juris.u- 
szeged.hu
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1. H istorical precedents
In Hungary, it was already in the 19th century that the juries were established and 
those debates took piacé which, with a certain of emphasis, enumerated the most 
common arguments tor and against the necessity of the lay judges.
Those who know the history of Hungary will nőt find at all curious that at this time 
(and as it will be discussed later on, alsó at the beginning of the 1990s) it was the 
political role of the jury that became the focus of the contemporary discourse. Similarly 
to Tocquville’s1 or Justice Black’s1 2 arguments, the main reasons fór supporting this 
institution were the following: first, the importance of creating a counter-balance to the 
ruling power; second, the popularization of the implementation of law.3
The system of juries was introduced temporarily during the 1848 Hungárián 
revolution against the Habsburg dynasty, and re-introduced after the fali of the 
revolution, following the forced compromise (1867) with the Austrians. (Although 
juries were introduced during the revolution concerning cases related to the press, 
they were quickly abolished in 1852, under the open Austrian dictatorship.) It is 
therefore nőt surprising that, similarly to American settlers in former times, the jury 
could be regarded as a peculiar symbol alsó by the supporters of the independence 
of Hungary. Furthermore, at the time when the development of the bourgeoisie, 
though with a certain delay, finally started and the bourgeoisie wanted to participate 
more actively in the administration of public affairs, the jury could prove to be an 
excellent piacé fór achieving this objective.
The ephemeral jury system in Hungary was based on the French jury system 
imported through the Germans. The similarity is demonstrated mostly by the 
composition of the jury and the selection of jurors. The jury consisted of three 
professional judges and 12 jurors, bút after the random selection of jurors the 
prosecution and the defense could drop out disfavored persons in equal numbers. 
It was the population on which the selection was based that differed from the 
contemporary French system, as the number of those who could be selected fór jury 
service was more restricted than it was in the contemporary Francé.4
2. Lay judges during the period of the one-party system
The Hungárián jury system was swept away by the First World War, as after World 
War I it did nőt serve the interests of the Horthy-regime to have a court which could 
be the source of conflicts, since this court might even disregard the laws if something 
offended against its sense of justice.
1 Alexis de Tocqueville: A demokrácia Amerikában. (Democracy in America) Gondolat Kiadó, 
Budapest, 1983.
2 Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Green v.U.S., 356 U.S. 165., 215-216. 1958.
3 Bónis- Degré- Varga: A magyar bírósági szervezet és perjog 2. Bővített kiadás. A kiegészítő' 
jegyzeteket írta: Dr. Béli Gábor. Zalaegerszeg 1996




After the Second World War, however, lay judges began to play an important 
role again. The transformation of the Hungárián judiciary started even before the 
communist takeover, and had as a consequence that this tieid, which was earlier 
relatively depoliticized, became an ideological battleground and, with respect 
to jurisdiction, the participation of people’s representatives as lay judges was 
considered by the Communist Party as one of the most efficient weapons in the 
ideological struggle. After the war, lay participation was realized, on the one hand, 
in the People’s Tribunals, established fór the investigation of war crimes, and on the 
other hand, in the traditional courts in the frame of a lay assessor system.
2.1 People’s Tribunals
The people’s tribunals and their institution fór appeal, the National Council of People’s 
Tribunals, were set up on 25 January, 1945, before the end of the war by the Provisional 
Government. Hungary was obliged by the Truce of Moscow to establish people’s 
tribunals and this obligation was reinforced by the Treaty of Paris, which ended World 
War II. People’s tribunals were organized at the seats of law-courts. The leaders of 
the councils were appointed by the Minister of Justice from among practicing lawyers 
and the six lay assessors were proposed by the five parties composing the so-called 
Independence Front and by the trade unions. The judges of the people’s tribunals had 
a three-month-long mandate, which was renewable. The first judgments were passed 
without legal authority. Later on, the authority of the people’s tribunals was extended 
to cases concerning the threat to peace. The new institution was intended to be a 
provisional one, and according to the first act on people’s tribunals, these courts would 
operate only until the restoration of the juries. The operation of the people’s tribunals 
marked the beginning of making mockery of justice.5 The sheer fact that in this period 
the people’s tribunals had to deal with an incredible number of cases compared with 
similar courts established in other countries, revealed that besides punishing the war
5 Before the people’s tribunal, the prosecution was represented by the people’s prosecutor 
nominated by the Minister of Justice. These were in many cases non-qualified lawyers who made 
serious mistakes concerning both the classification and the evidences. Their rhetoric was based on 
the pretentious slogans ofthe contemporary press. The strong position ofthe prosecution against 
the defense was striking. The words of the intimidated or party-loyal counsels resembled rather 
the speech of the prosecution than the speech of the defense. When the counsels represented 
too strongly the interests of the defendant, they were either reprímanded by the prosecutor or the 
judge or deprived of the right to represent the defense. Even the question whether the defendant 
had the right to choose his/her counsel was a matter fór debate. The Bar of Budapest, on the 
pretext of conformíng to public opíníon, decided that the defense of war criminals was to be 
represented only by an appointed counsel. At the time when one could choose one’s counsel there 
were still courageous counsels fór the defense. However, after the introduction of the system of 
appointed counsels it became possible to select the counsels on a political basis. The president 
of the people’s tribunal, who initially did nőt have the right to vote, was basically responsible fór 
the instruction of laypersons and fór the leading of the court hearing. However, the president had 
a large influence on the outcome of the cases. It was him who informed the lay judges about the 
law as it applied to the case, and about the possible sanctions. Consequently, it was nőt írrelevant 
fór the Communist Party who held this position.
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criminals these institutions served other objectives as well, namely the enforcement of 
party interests and the removal of political opponents.6 On the pretext of the punishment 
of war criminals which was required by the Western powers, the Communist Party led 
by Rákosi Mátyás began the elimination of the other parties with the help of these 
tribunals. All of a sudden more and more seditious elements were discovered among 
the members of the victorious political parties through the proceedings of people’s 
tribunals, mostly on the basis of false accusations. As a consequence, the members 
of the democratic parties either joined the Communist Party or left the political scene 
in order to avoid retaliation. Looking back it is quite difficult to understand how Rákosi 
and his party managed to control the institution of people’s tribunals to such an extent, 
while the people’s judges were delegated by five parties. This can be partially explained 
by the fact that the Communist Party aided by the Soviets had fiiled the positions of 
council’s leaders and those of people’s prosecutors by their party members before the 
democratic parties could react. Furthermore, the communists got somé of their party 
members to jóin various democratic parties and asked them to weaken these parties 
from inside. Finally, they had control over a considerable number of judges, who were 
intimidated by the threat that their pást would be revealed. Such illegal practices were 
either planned by the communists led by Rákosi or executed under the explicit orders 
of the soviet leadership. The proceedings of people’s tribunals therefore disregarded 
the proclaimed ideological objectives and instead of fascists it was often the members 
of the victorious democratic parties who were accused. After 1949 the people’s 
tribunals began to lose their importance, since their role was taken on by traditional 
courts. It was only after the 1956 revolution that they became significant political means 
again, when the conviction of revolutionaries had to be hidden behind the mask of “the 
people” to legitimize the régimé.7
2.2 The lay assessor system
In the course of 1948-1949 a turning-point came about when the communist takeover 
of the power inaugurated the éra of a governing system based on the Soviet 
example. At this time the new system required more definitely the reorganization 
of jurisdiction, and this marked the beginning of the epoch of socialist legislation. 
The process of legislation started with the reform of substantive and procedúrái law 
on the basis of the Soviet example. The modern codes having come intő existence 
under the Austro-Plungarian régimé were gradually replaced. We can alsó observe 
the commencement of the disintegration of the highly complex four-level jurisdiction 
system with the objective that a new jurisdiction system be created in accordance with 
the party organization and the administrative system. Act XI. of 1949, which limited the 
possibilities of appeal in the case of criminal proceedings, alsó ruled on the initiation *1
6 Between 1945 and 1950, about 10000 people were accused in Austria, 17000 in Belgium, less 
than 20000 in Czechoslovakia, and almost 70000 in Hungary
1 FLECK Zoltán: Jog a diktatúrában. Jogszolgáltató mechanizmusok a totális és poszt-totális 




of the lay assessor system, the authority of which was extended to other fields of law 
later on. This meant that the professional judges formed judicial councils together with 
the so-called lay assessors on various levels of the court system, in a way that the 
judges had equal rights within the council generally composed of one professional 
judge and two lay assessors.8
This system was practically the adaptation of mixed tribunals, present in Germany 
and other European countries, to the Hungárián legal system. It is interesting to note 
that this frequently criticized institution proved to be more persistent than anyone 
would have expected, given the fact that it is still in existence substantially in the same 
form. According the first act on lay assessors, this form of administration of justice was 
initiated on the one hand to ensure that the opinion, the sound view of life, and the 
natural sense of justice of the working people play a role during court hearings and 
in the passing of judgments, and on the other hand to make possible the democratic 
control of the judge. Taking intő consideration the particular political context, it is 
nőt difficult to realize the objective of the latter function of people’s tribunals. The 
aim was by no means to supervise the impartiality or the incorruptibility of the 
judge, bút to have control over the judges socialized in the former system. After the 
communist takeover of the power the judges appointed under the former régimé were 
progressively intimidated and removed. This could happen by assigning lay judges 
efficiently trained by the party leadership, who were to work with the professional 
judge, and had to report on his activity and obstruct his work. This was made possible 
by the new law which from the very beginning gave equal rights to the lay assessor 
and the professional judge. That is to say, if the law ordained the participation of the 
lay assessor, professional judges and lay assessors had to administer justice strictly 
together in every phase of the procedure from the determination of issues of fact and 
law to the passing of the judgment.
After the Stalinistera, however, this institution gradually lostits political significance, 
and the dominance of professional judges became more and more manifest. In other 
words, from the 1960s, the stabilization of the communist régimé and the considerable 
changes in the composition of the judicial society made it unnecessary to use lay 
judges fór political reasons. With the emergence of loyal judges with a more and more 
technocratic view, the lay persons lost their importance.
Previous research from the perspective of the sociology of law carried out by 
Kulcsár Kálmán9 at the beginning of the 1970s already demonstrated this trend. 
The results of these studies show that the participation of lay assessors is quite low, 
their contribution to the making of the judgment is exceptional. Although numerous 
reasons of this dysfunction were revealed by the researchers, the most important one 
proved to be the selective process, which made it possible that usually elderly, retired 
people be “selected”, who would nőt “disturb” the work of the professional judge.
8 ZINNER Tibor: Háborús bűnösök, népbíróságok. História, 1982: IV. évf.. 2. sz.
9 Kulcsár Kálmán: A népi ülnök a bíróságon. (Lay assessors in court) Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest 1971.
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3. Lay assessor system after the change of the political system
It becomes obvious from the above discussion that in Hungary lay participation 
cannot be regarded as a great success of the 20th century. What is most surprising 
is the fact that while most institutions discredited in a similar way were abolished or 
transformed, the lay assessor system is still in existence although it is widely known 
that this system does nőt work properly and that the recrutation of the necessary 
number of lay assessors causes constant problem.
Almost immediately after the free elections in 1990, there is a demand fór the 
reform of the lay justice system, the main objective of which was the introduction of the 
jury in Hungary10 1. After the dictatorship, this demand seemed to be logical fór many 
people, and they argued by underlining only the political advantages which were 
proclaimed by authors from Lord Devlin11 to the ones quoted above. The legitimacy 
of jurisdiction should be reinforced by increasing the role of voters in the same way 
as the election of members of Parliament creates the legitimacy of legislation directly, 
and that of the executive power indirectly. The political advantages alone could nőt 
convince those who had ambivalent feelings towards the jury in terms of competence. 
This is the reason why the proposals on the introduction of the jury were removed 
from the agenda in spite of historical traditions.
However, the arguments managed to weaken or wipe out those efforts which 
would have set out the future of Hungárián judiciary in the opposite direction by 
intending to eliminate the role of lay persons.
Finally, due to the practical problems of the selection of lay assessors, the lay 
assessor system was modified only to the extent that the number of cases requiring the 
participation of lay judges was limited and that the term “people’ assessor”12, typical 
fór the socialist éra, was replaced by the term “assessor”13. However, this institution 
remained pseudo-democratic and practically unnecessary in its present form.
3.1 Rules presently in force
One of the greatest attempts at the reform of the Hungárián judiciary was made 
in 1997. The alterations affect principally the court organization and the external 
administration of courts. (The court system became more complex and the role of 
the Ministry of Justice was taken over by the National Council of Jurisdiction, which is 
composed mostly of judges.) The reform alsó contained changes concerning the lay 
assessor system. (We claim, however, that the reform was nőt far-reaching enough to 
solve this problem of the Hungárián jurisdiction.)
10 Botos Gábor: Az esküdtbíróság újbóli bevezetéséről. In: Rendészeti Szemle. A 
Belügyminisztérium folyóirata.2 / 1992 11.-51.





According to the new law, the assessors work together with judges in administering 
justice. They obtain this position by election, based on the principle of people’s 
sovereignty. The lower age limit to be able to become an assessor is raised írom 
24 to 30. This alteration is parallel with the rise in the lower age limit of becoming a 
judge. The selection of the assessors follows principally the former regulation. The 
assessors are nominated by Hungárián citizens having domicile under the jurisdiction 
of the court and a right to vote, by the local governments under the jurisdiction of the 
court and by non-governmental organizations with the exception of political parties. 
Depending on the level of the court which assessors will be assigned to, they are 
selected by various bodies of local governments. The law did nőt change the four- 
year-long mandate of the assessors. The preparation of the selection and the decision 
how many assessors should be selected fór particular courts belong to the authority 
of the National Council of Judiciary. The date of the election is set by the President 
of the Republic. The assessors are assigned to the particular judicial councils by the 
president of the court. In contrast to the former regulation the new law provides in 
details on when and how the term of Office of the assessors expires. The assessor is 
allowed to hold this position until the age of 70. In the judicature the assessors still 
have the same rights as the professional judges.14 Furthermore, there is a raise in 
the inadequately low remuneration, which is thereby adjusted to the responsibility 
characteristic fór the position of a judge.15
3.2 Reality and reform
As a result of the modification somé positive alterations can be observed. (The upper 
age limit of 70, fór instance, excludes the possibility that really old people incapable of 
following the events of a court hearing become lay assessors.) However, there is still a 
large gap between the pretentious rules and the reality. In our opinion, the new rules 
did nőt change essentially this institution, which thus remained dysfunctional.
Yet, we are convinced that, taking intő consideration the rules of Hungárián 
procedúrái law, mixed judicature in the proper sense of the word is needed on every 
level of the court system. One should nőt be a partisan of legal realism to be aware 
of the risk of letting a single judge reach decisions which have a large influence on 
the lives of citizens, as such decisions depend highly on the actual State of mind and 
powers of concentration of a single person. Without the intention to take part in the 
debates on the necessity of lay participation, we claim that due to budgetary limits 
and the Hungárián court system this problem can be solved only by promoting lay 
participation in today’s Hungary.
The above-mentioned problem manifests itself mostly in the so-called local courts 
representing the lowest level of the judicial hierarchy. These courts have to deal with 
the majority of the cases. However, it is exactly in these courts that in many cases
14 However, the equal rights are nőt parallel with equal obligations. The assessor is allowed 
to be the member of a party, which is alsó reínforced by a decision of the Constitutional Court: 
(51/1992. (X.22)
15 Act LXVII of 1997, §122-128
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young (30-40-year-old) and inexperienced judges pass judgments alone16, and in 
more serious cases together with two lay assessors.
Furthermore, they have to deal with hundreds of cases at the same time without 
an adequate number of administrative assistants. Nevertheless, concerning criminal 
proceedings the Flungarian procedúrái law gives especially great power - particularly with 
respect to the consideration of evidences - to the judges in the courts of the first instance. 
(The part of their judgment related to the consideration of evidences cannot be changed 
in principle by the appeal court.) In such a situation it would be of paramount importance 
that the professional judge would nőt have to bear the full weight of responsibility and to 
decide alone on people’s future. At present, lay persons are nőt ready to assume a role with 
such high responsibility. Despite the legislators’ intention fór them to have such a role it is 
obstructed by the selection process, by the survival of lay judges’ behavior developed in 
the socialist éra, and by the prejudices of the professional judges etc. As we have already 
mentioned, it would be possible according to law that the lay persons outnumbering 
the professional judges reach a decision opposed to that of the professional judge. 
Flowever, there are hardly any examples in the judicial practice of the pást few decades 
where the professional judge, disagreeing with the judgment, expressed his dissenting 
opinion attached to the court’s decision.17 Yet, according to the judges the lay persons 
might make useful remarks especially if they have better knowledge of an issue than the 
professional judge owing to their profession. The results of our previous study18 show 
that the judges do nőt consider the lay persons as equal partnere, they are nőt involved in 
the passing of decisions, which is nőt expected by the majority of assessors either. Evén 
those assessors who initially are active to a certain extent shortly take on a passive role, 
adapting themselves to the traditions, and become mere observers of the events. Taking 
all this intő consideration it is nőt surprising that assessors are often mockingly called 
‘ornaments’ by the lawyers. This ironic attitűdé was alsó reinforced by the amendment of 
the existing law in 1995. The situation of the assessors is best characterized by the fact 
that their replacement has no consequence in terms of procedúrái law. That is to say, 
assessors can be changed freely during the procedure. Should the date of the court 
hearing nőt be suitable fór one of the assessors, s/he can be replaced by the judge in 
charge of the assignment of the assessors. Knowing what happens in practice we can 
point out that the present form of the lay assessor system is nothing bút the caricature 
of people’s participation. This is why we find that a comprehensive reform in this respect 
cannot be further postponed in order to give sense to the already existing institution by 
acknowledging the necessity of mixed tribunals.
In our view the problem could be solved by making the assessors’ service 
civic duty19, by elaborating carefully the selective mechanism, and by ensuring an 
appropriate remuneration fór the assessors. We are convinced that in order to achieve
16 In criminal proceedings in case ofcrímes which can be sanctioned by nőt more than three 
years of imprisonment
17 Az ítélkezők felelőssége — Magyar Nemzet 1999. március 24. 7.p
18 BADÓ Attila & NAGY Zsolt: Az ülnök szerepe a bíróságon. (The role of assessors in court). 
Manuscript.
19 Orat least it should become an activity giving such an amount of social esteem that it would 
become really possible to choose írom the applicants
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the above-mentioned objectives the Hungárián lay assessor system should adopt of 
Solutions used in juries and lay assessor systems in other countries.
At present those become lay assessors who would like to. This intention is usually 
fueled nőt by an insatiable desire tor participating in the administration of justice bút 
rather by the modest remuneration or by the ‘appetitus societatis’. Itwas demonstrated 
by the last few assessors’ selections that there are much fewer candidates fór 
this position than it would have been necessary. 20Even today, the overwhelming 
majority of the candidates are senior citizens, who represent a particular segment of 
society. It might sound strange considering the efforts made by other countries, and 
especially by the United States to enforce the ‘fair cross-section requirement’ and 
the constitutional requirement of impartiality. Although the theoretical and practical 
problems of the selective mechanism are known21, it is evident that experiences from 
America, from Francé and other countries could prove to be useful. It is unacceptable 
that with the exception of the judge responsible fór the assignment of the assessors, 
no one else has the right guaranteed by procedúrái law to make objections to the 
choice of the assessors. We do nőt intend to give work fór the sociologists and 
psychologists22, bút we think that the “voir dire” procedure could be applied with 
certain restrictions in the case of assessors.
Other patterns related to the passing of judgments ensuring the responsibility and 
the reál participation of lay persons could alsó be applied. Fór instance, secret voting 
on certain issues, on guilt, and on the sanctions could be made mandatory. We are 
convinced that through such modifications carried out following the suggestions of 
experts the present situation could be altered in a way that the positive effects should 
be felt by the professional judges as well.
In the present paper, we do nőt aim at giving effective suggestions concerning the 
reform. Our only objective was to draw attention to intolerable situation of Hungárián 
lay assessor system, which can discredit lay justice and which calls fór an urgent 
solution. In order to be able to make effective suggestions, in addition to studies from 
the perspective of the sociology of law, there is a need to reveal and solve practical 
problems, which should be based on active cooperation of experts representing 
various fields of law. We hope that we should nőt wait long until the beginning of such 
cooperation.
20 Lassan befejeződik a laikus bírák választása Népszava 1997. október 30. 6. p
21 Mitchell S. Zuklie (1996) Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, California Law 
Revies Vol. 84:101
22 Sage, Wayne (1973): Psychoiogy and the Angéla Davis Jury. Humán Behavior Magaziné, 
January, 56-61.Murray SAMS, Jr. (1969) „Persuasion in the Voir Dire: The Plaintiff’s Approach,” 
in Persuasion: The key to damages 3-8 G. Holmes ed.
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